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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the U.S.-German Double Tax Treaty' generally proves valu-
able for both U.S. and German companies, one of its main provisions is
contrary to European Union law. The so-called "limitation on benefits"
clause in this Treaty requires companies seeking relief from double taxation
to be at least fifty percent held by German or U.S. nationals. 2 This clause is
intended to prevent nationals of non-Treaty countries from abusing the
treaty benefits by establishing conduit companies in the contracting states.
Although such clauses exist in many treaties, this clause is inappropriate in
the U.S.-German Treaty because it results in discriminatory treatment of
corporations in Germany that are not majority-owned by German or U.S.
nationals. This discriminatory treatment conflicts with the freedom of es-
tablishment, as guaranteed by the EC Treaty,3 if the owners who disqualify
the company from the U.S.-German Treaty are nationals of Member States
of the European Union.4 The limitation on benefits clause makes the in-
vestment in a company in Germany less attractive for EU nationals because
the company will not receive Treaty benefits and will face a higher tax rate
in its German tax bill.
This comment details why the limitation on benefits clause of the U.S.-
German Treaty is contrary to European Union law.5 Part I describes the
discriminatory situation which German companies may face and illustrates
how tax treaty abuse could occur and how to prevent it. Part I also contains
an introduction to the U.S.-German Treaty and provides an example of the
conflict between U.S. tax treaties and European Union law. Part II analyzes
in detail the Treaty's discriminatory features with respect to European Un-
'Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-
F.R.G., S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-10 (1990), reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3249
[hereinafter U.S.-German Treaty, or Treaty]. The Treaty was brought into force on August
21, 1991 and became generally effective on and after January 1, 1990. On the same date, a
Protocol to the Treaty and a Technical Explanation were signed. Protocol to the Treaty,
Aug. 29, 1989, id., 3250 [hereinafter Protocol]; Treasury Department Technical Explana-
tion, id., 3255 [hereinafter Technical Explanation]. The present Treaty replaced the prior
Treaty of 1954. Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic
of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, July
22, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., reprinted in 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 112,471.2 See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note I, art. 28(l)(e), 3249.57.
3See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The EC Treaty is based on
the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, and amended and renamed by the Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1,
and the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573. The freedom of establishment is guaranteed in Article 52. EC TREATY art. 52.4Hereinafter European Union, EU, or Community.
sAs used in this comment, "European Union law" encompasses both the European Court
of Justice's case law and law established by the EC Treaty.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:165 (1997)
ion law and discusses potential justifications for this discrimination based
on the case law of the European Court of Justice.6 Part II concludes that the
limitation on benefits clause constitutes unjustified discrimination and vio-
lates the EC Treaty. Part III reflects on possible solutions to the conflict,
and it recommends a renegotiation of the U.S.-German Treaty. At present,
an implementation of the derivative benefits concepts into this Treaty is ad-
visable. However, Part I recommends that all bilateral treaties between
the United States and EU Member States should later be replaced by a sin-
gle tax treaty between the United States and the European Union. Part IV
summarizes the conclusions drawn in Parts I-lII.
A. The Discriminatory Situation for German Companies under the U.S.-
German Treaty
The following situation could occur in the context of the U.S.-German
Treaty. A parent company7 in Germany operates a subsidiary in the United
States. The German company receives dividends from its U.S. subsidiary.
The dividends are subject to U.S. and German income tax. In the United
States, those dividends are subject to a thirty percent withholding tax be-
cause they are paid by a U.S. domestic corporation to a non-resident of the
United States. Those same dividends are also subject to German income
6 The European Court of Justice, hereinafter Court of Justice, or Court, is one of the main
institutions of the European Union, together with the European Parliament, the Council, the
Commission, and the Court of Auditors. EC TREATY art. 4. The Court's task, as laid out in
Articles 164-188 of the EC TREATY, is to observe the interpretation and application of Euro-
pean Union law, in addition to the judiciaries of the Member States. EC TREATY arts. 164-
68. Therefore, the compatibility of the U.S.-German Treaty clause with European Union law
is determined by the EC Treaty as interpreted and applied by the Court. The Court's deci-
sion-making is prepared and assisted by Advocates General acting as amiei curiae. EC
TREATY art. 166. The opinions submitted by the Advocates General sometimes contain
authoritative legal analysis which is not expressly reproduced in the Court's judgment.
Those opinions are hereinafter cited as "Opinion {name}."
7 In this comment, the term "company" serves as a general term representing any form of
union or association of persons carrying on a commercial or industrial enterprise. See, e.g.,
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 281 (6th ed. 1990). See also EC TREATY art. 58. In most cases,
however, a German company seeking treaty benefits will preferably be set up as a German
corporate entity. This is due to general choice of entity considerations but the foremost rea-
son is that a corporation is a separate entity for tax purposes. See U.S.-German Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 3(l)(e), 3249.07 (defining company as "any body corporate"). Under German
law, two types of corporations are relevant: the Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung
[GmbH] and the Aktiengesellschaft [AG]. Where the term "shareholder" is used in this
comment, it refers to the publicly traded shares of the AG. However, the same issues are ap-
plicable to holders of an interest in a GmbH because the wording of the Treaty uses the gen-
eral term "interest". U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1), 3249.57.
8See I.R.C. § 871(a), § 881 (CCH 1997). An exception to this rule occurs where the
dividend is not subject to withholding tax if, apart from other requirements, at least 80% of
the domestic corporation's gross income is foreign source business income. I.R.C. § 871(i).
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tax.9 In this situation, the German parent profits twice under the U.S.-
German Treaty. First, the Treaty provides relief from double taxation by
allowing the parent to apply the German tax exemption method with respect
to its dividend income. ° Second, the dividends, paid by a subsidiary to its
parent, are eligible for a lower five percent U.S. withholding tax rate under
the Treaty."1
An abuse of the U.S.-German Treaty would occur in this situation if a
resident of a third country that has not concluded a tax treaty with the
United States imitates this construction and interposes a German company
between itself and the United States. This German corporation, which acts
as a mere conduit, would fall within the ambit of the Treaty and would re-
ceive the preferential tax rate of five percent established by the Treaty al-
though its owners have no connections to the United States, Germany, or to
the Treaty. To prevent this abuse, the German company intending to take
advantage of the lower Treaty tax rate must satisfy several qualifications.
Article 28(l)(e)(aa) of the U.S.-German Treaty, the so-called ownership
percentage test, requires that a German company be owned by at least fifty
percent German or U.S. nationals before the company enjoys the treaty
benefits.12 Thus, a German company does not qualify for the Treaty if, for
example, sixty percent of its shareholders are French nationals, and forty
percent are German nationals. Such a company would receive, after taxes,
only seventy percent of the subsidiary's dividend instead of the ninety-five
percent it would receive if the preferential rate under the Treaty were ap-
plied. Additionally, the dividend income is not excluded from German tax
but does, however, receive a credit or deduction allowance for the U.S. in-
come tax paid.13 This treatment results in a higher overall tax burden for
the disqualified company.14
9See Einkommensteuergesetz [Income Tax Code] [EStG] § 20(1) Nr. 1. The income
consisting of dividend payments is part of the gross income. EStG §§ 2(1) Nr. 5, 2(2) Nr. 2.
'
0 See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 23(2)(a), 3249.47. If the parent holds
less than 10% of the voting shares of the subsidiary, the Treaty only allows a German tax
credit against the U.S. tax paid. U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 23(2)(b)(aa),
3249.47.
"See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10(2)(a), 3249.21.
12See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(l)(e)(aa), 1 3249.57.
13See EStG, supra note 9, § 34c(1), (2).
14In turn, this also economically affects the company's dividends to its shareholders.
However, the entity which is legally affected by the disqualification is the company liable to
tax, not its shareholders.
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B. The Prevention of Tax Treaty Abuse
1. The Role of Tax Treaties
Tax treaties are established to avoid the problem of international dou-
ble taxation.' 5 Double taxation occurs when the same income is taxed
twice. 16 Such situations often result at the international level when more
than one country has a claim to tax the same income. The problem arises
especially if a country levies taxes upon its nationals on a worldwide basis
instead of on a territorial basis.1 7 In international transactions, one coun-
try's territorial claim to tax may coincide with another country's claim
based on citizenship or residency.1 8  The taxpayer then must pay taxes
twice, unless a country's national law or a double tax treaty provides relief.
Tax treaties seek to alleviate or eliminate this double taxation. 19 For
this purpose, most treaties apply to individual and corporate income taxa-
tion. 0 A country's economic rationale to enter into a treaty and build a
network of tax treaties is two-fold. On a macroeconomic level, countries
intend to abolish discrimination against international trade and to encourage
cross-border investments. With respect to each taxpayer, however, treaties
lessen the excessive individual burden of being taxed twice which may be
unfair and unjust. Treaties also provide a higher degree of predictability
and certainty for individuals planning their tax environment because treaty
obligations tend to restrict the contracting states' ability to change their do-
mestic tax law. 1
Tax treaties are international law obligations that modify the existing
national tax law regimes of the involved countries.22 They typically classify
1SSueh treaties are mostly bilateral, sometimes multilateral, agreements between inde-
pendent nations on the level of international public law. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990).
16See, e.g., 2 PHILip F. POSTLEWAITE & TAMARA L. FRANTZEN, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION § 14.05 (2d ed. 1996).
17Both the U.S. and the German systems of taxation follow the approach of worldwide
income taxation. This means that their nationals and residents are generally subject to tax on
all items of their income regardless of where their income is earned. Most other countries,
however, restrict themselves to taxation of income earned within their territories.
'
8For example, earnings may be subject to U.S. income tax due to the recipient's U.S.
citizenship. Yet, this same income may also be subject to a foreign income tax because it is
earned in a foreign country.
19See POSTLEWArrE & FRANTZEN, supra note 16.20The U.S.-German Treaty, for example, covers the U.S. federal income taxes imposed
by the Internal Revenue Code, the excise tax imposed on insurance premiums, and the Ger-
man individual income tax, corporation tax, trade tax, and capital tax. U.S.-German Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 2(1), 3249.05.
21See PosTLEwArrE & FRANTzEN, supra note 16. However, unilateral changes in do-
mestic tax law can occur, even if these changes are in conflict with prior treaty obligations.
See infra note 69 for a discussion of "treaty override."
22See POSTLEWArrE & FRANTZEN, supra note 16.
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specific types of income.23 For each class of income, one country waives
the right to tax, and the authority to tax is assigned to the other country.
The reassignment of taxing authority is generally made with reference to
the source of the income because the source of income most closely reflects
the economic structure of transactions. In addition, treaties often reduce the
applicable tax rate.24 As a result, a specific type of income may be taxed
only in one of the contracting states, at the regular or a lower tax rate, or the
income may not be taxed at all.
Most countries also offer relief from double taxation under their na-
tional tax laws.25 This relief can be accomplished by exempting foreign
26 2source income, granting a tax credit for foreign taxes paid,27 or allowing a
deduction as an expense for foreign taxes paid.28 Yet, these rules are not in
addition to a tax treaty relief regime. Instead, they are usually applied in
cases in which no applicable tax treaty is in force.29 As purely domestic
measures they are unilateral and often cannot resolve international tax con-
flicts in the absence of tax treaties.30
2. Limitation on Benefit Clauses as a Prevention to Tax Treaty Abuse
Tax treaties are advantageous to taxpayers because they reduce or
eliminate tax burdens that would persist in the absence of such treaties.
Such advantages, however, may promote the abuse of treaties. Individuals
from countries that have concluded no, or only unfavorable, tax treaties of-
ten feel encouraged to take advantage of a tax treaty between other coun-
tries that is not normally available to them.31  In order to do this, a
corporation or an individual in a non-treaty country will form an entity in a
treaty country to take advantage of preferential tax treatment and then fun-
nel the profits back to the non-treaty country. This pattern is often referred
23See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Conven-
tion of September 20, 1996, art. 6-21, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 214 [hereinafter
U.S. Model Treaty].24See id.
25Id.
26See, e.g., I.R.C. § 911 (a).
27See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901(a).28This method is not acknowledged under U.S. tax law. German tax law, however, al-
lows a deduction of foreign taxes paid if the taxpayer so requests. EStG, supra note 9,
§ 34c(2).29See, e.g., EStG, supra note 9, § 34c(6). The section grants double tax relief only if no
double tax treaty exists with the concerned foreign country. Id.30See POSTLEwArrE & FRANTzEN, supra note 16.31There is no complete international tax treaty network. Many countries have no tax
treaties due to their less-developed tax systems or for political reasons. Others have termi-
nated existing treaties. See Andre Fogarasi et al., Current Status of US. Tax Treaties, 26
TAX MGMf. INT'L J. 139 (1997) (listing current U.S. treaties).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:165 (1997)
to as "treaty shopping., 32 A "conduit company" is an entity set up for the
sole purpose of passing income from one country where it receives prefer-
ential tax treatment under a treaty, through to another country.
Treaty shopping can be prevented.33  This is usually accomplished
through clauses that restrict treaty benefits to few individuals and entities on
the basis of their proximity to the treaty countries.34 These clauses are
called "anti-abuse" or "limitation on benefit" clauses. The clauses try to
exclude mere conduits or leveraged shells from taking advantage of the
treaty benefits by identifying a company's substantial business nexus to one
or both contracting states.3  From a technical point of view, those clauses
may be seen as further limitations on treaty use, as well as being clauses
that determine the personal scope of the treaty.3
6
The U.S. policy is generally to include limitation on benefits clauses in
new or amended treaties.37 If existing treaties do not include these clauses,
the United States urges its contracting partner to renegotiate the treaty, or
32See, e.g., Simone Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-treaty-shopping
Provisions: A Comparative Analysis, 29 VMlD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 191, 204-15 (1996); Wil-
liam P. Streng, "Treaty Shopping": Tax Treaty "Limitation of Benefits" Issues, 15 Hous. L
INT'L L. 1 (1992); Bemd Wegmann, Das "Treaty Shopping" aus US-amerikanischer Sicht,
30 REcHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WmRTSCHAr [RiW] 787 (1984). In a broader sense, the
term "treaty shopping" comprises all attempts to reroute income through countries and
thereby to reap tax treaty benefits that were otherwise unavailable. Two main methods fall
under the term: The direct conduit method that uses tax exemptions in the country where the
conduit is placed, and the stepping-stone method that uses the possibility of a base reduction
in that country, i.e., offsetting the taxes paid in that country by transferring all profits to a
third country. See Haug, supra, at 205-7.33 See generally Kenneth A. Grady, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of Pre-
vention Techniques, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 626 (1983); Haug, supra note 32, at 221-3 1.34See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 23, art. 22.35As the Technical Explanation to the U.S.-German Treaty points out, the thrust of its
limitation on benefits clause is to assure that the benefits are not extended to persons "not
having a substantial business in, or business nexus with, the other Contracting State." See
Technical Explanation, supra note 1, art. 28. Many different concepts for identifying such
nexus are in use in other treaties. See also Streng, supra note 32, at 23 (listing a variety of
tests that have been used in U.S. treaties).36Both the personal scope and the anti-treaty-shopping clauses limit the benefits. See,
e.g., Richard E. Andersen, ALI Study Recommends Changes in U.S. Tax Treaty Policy, 2 J.
INT'L TAX'N 253, 255 (1991) (considering treaty shopping prevention rules as exceptions to
residence rules).37See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Technical Explanation of the United States
Model Income Tax Convention, Sept. 20, 1996, art. 22, reprinted in I Tax Treaties (CCH)
214A. Article 22 expresses that "the United States holds strongly to the view that tax trea-
ties should include provisions that specifically prevent misuse of treaties by residents of third
countries." Id.; see also Haug, supra note 32, at 238-57; H. David Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty
Abuse: Policies and Issues, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 763, 779-810 (1983) (providing
history of limitation on benefit clauses in U.S. treaties); H. David Rosenbloom, Toward a
New Tax Treaty Policy for a New Decade, 9 Am. J. TAX PoL'Y 77, 92 (1991) (criticizing the
U.S. approach to limitation on benefit clauses as "overdoing" and suggesting that policies be
rethought).
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even terminates the treaty.38 Although U.S. treaties are based on a Model
Treaty,39 treaties between the United States and European countries include
such clauses with much variation in their details.40 Due to the strong nego-
tiating position of the United States and prior treaty history, these clauses
are detailed and stringent in their attempt to avoid treaty abuse.
Under the U.S.-German Treaty, the taxpayer must overcome two hur-
dles in order to receive preferential tax treatment. First, the taxpayer must
fall within the personal scope of the Treaty.41 In order to meet this require-
ment, a corporation must be a resident of a contracting state. 42 A corpora-
tion that seeks to treaty shop easily fulfills the personal scope requirement
. 43 tee utst
by incorporating in a contracting state. Second, the taxpayer must satisfy
Article 28's limitation on benefits clause.44
C. The U.S.-German Treaty
An analysis of the U.S.-German Treaty's limitation on benefits clause
is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the U.S.-German Treaty was
the first treaty between the United States and a European country that con-
tained an elaborate limitation on benefit clause.45 As a result, the Treaty has
been discussed extensively,46 and this clause has served as a model for other
38For example, in 1995 the United States terminated a 1980 treaty between the United
States and Malta, because the 1980 treaty had no limitation on benefits provision and the two
countries could not come to an agreement on that issue. Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Malta with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 21,
1980, U.S.-Malta, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5803.39U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 23.4 0 See, e.g., Monique van Herksen, Limitation on Benefits and the Competent Authority
Determination, 50 BULL. INT'L FISCAL Doc. 19, 22 (1996) (giving an overview of different
clauses used in treaties between the United States and European countries).41 U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4, 3249.09.
4 2 1d.
43 Every corporation organized under German law must specify its statutory seat in Ger-
many. According to the "seat rule," which governs most civil law systems, a corporation is
only recognized as a separate entity if its principal place of business is in the state of incor-
poration. See Werner F. Ebke & Markus Gockel, European Corporate Law, 24 INT'L LAW.
239 (1990). Thus, the state of incorporation, which is decisive under the "internal affairs
rule" of U.S. corporate law, is only of secondary importance for the corporate status. See
also GOTz HuECK, in ADOLF BAUMBACH & GOTz HUECK, GMBH-GEsETZ, KOMMENTAR,
Einleitung, annotation 29 (16th ed. 1996); Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, Umzug von Gesellschaften
in Europa, 154 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT
[ZHR] 325, 326 (1990); Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, Niederlassungsfreiheit: Diskriminierungs-
oder Beschriinkungsverbot?, 43 DER BEMREB [DB] 2573, 2577-81 (1990); Martina R.
Deckert, Europiiisches Unternehmensrecht, 1996 ZErrscHuRrT FOR EURoPIscHES
WmrscHAFrs- & STEuEPRECHT [EWS] 265, 270.
44See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28, 3249.57.41See id.
46See, e.g., Richard E. Andersen, US. and West Germany Sign New Ground-Breaking
Tax Treaty, 1 J. INT'L TAx'N 60 (1990); Friedhelm Jacob, The New German-US. Double
Taxation Treaty, 29 EUR. TAX'N 326 (1989); Reinhard P61lath, Investing in Germany under
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treaties. 47 In fact, the most recent U.S. Model Treaty contains a clause de-
rived from the U.S.-German Treaty.48 This comment has already noted that
the clause in the U.S.-German Treaty might interfere with European Union
law.49 However, scholarship in this area has not yet examined why this
clause and similar clauses in other treaties impede European Union law.
Second, a closer investigation of the clause could facilitate the design
of future provisions which conform with European Union law.50 After con-
cluding the Treaty with Germany, the United States renegotiated and en-
tered into treaties with other European countries. These treaties implicitly
suggest that the contracting states were aware of the issue of incompatibility
with European Union law because the treaties contain modified clauses in
reaction to criticism about a possible infringement of European Union law
by the U.S.-German Treaty. These treaties expressly deal with the role of
European companies seeking treaty benefits.51 However, some of the newly
the New U.S.-German Tax Treaty, 2 INT'L TAX'N 175 (1991); Helmut Debatin, Das neue
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen mit den USA (pts. I & 2), 43 DER BETRIEB [DB] 598, 654
(1990); Wilhelm Haarmann, The New Double Tax Treaty Between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States ofAmerica, 17 INTERTAX 269 (1989).47See, e.g., Joseph DeCarlo et al., An Overview of the Limitation on Benefits Article of
the New Netherlands-U.S. Income Tax Convention, 22 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 271 (1993); Ian
K. Sugarman, The US.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty: Closing the Doors on the Treaty
Shoppers, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 776, 797 (1994). Germany, originally critical of limitation
on benefits clauses, now also tends to support more stringent clauses. See Friedrich Hey,
New German Tax Laws Aim to Increase Investment, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 109, 111 (1994);
Wolfgang Ritter, The German Approach to Double Taxation Treaty Negotiations, 19
INTERTAX 204, 209 (1991). Surprisingly, prior German treaties set an even higher threshold
of qualification than the U.S.-German Treaty does. For example, a treaty with Kuwait that
was signed in 1987 and entered into force in 1989 requires at least 75% of a German corpo-
ration to be owned by the state of Kuwait, and the remaining percentage to be owned by
German or Kuwaiti nationals. Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the State of Kuwait for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Capital and for the Fostering of Economic Relations, Dec. 4, 1987, F.R.G.-Kuwait, art.
23(1), Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette] [BGBI.] 11 1989, at 354, 637 (F.R.G.),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, TNI File, 93 TNI 92-17.4 8See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 23, art. 22.49See P6llath, supra note 46, at 178.5 0 See Luc Hinnekens, Compatibility of Bilateral Tax Treaties with European Community
Law. The Rules, 1994 EC TAX REv. 146, 164 (proposing comprehensive studies of individ-
ual treaty provisions as a preparation to renegotiation).
5'See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the French Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Aug. 31, 1994, U.S.-
Fr., art. 30, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3001.31 [hereinafter U.S.-French Treaty];
Convention Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., art. 26, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH)
6103.28 [hereinafter U.S.-Dutch Treaty]; Convention Between the United States of America
and the Kingdom of Spain for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fis-
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designed clauses are controversial and also may not totally conform to
European Union law. For example, the new U.S.-French, U.S.-Dutch, and
U.S.-Spanish treatiess 2 do not seem to be fully compatible with European
Union law, because their limitation on benefits clauses impose constraints
on ownership by residents of the European Union.53 Also, these treaties are
problematic in terms of the exact wording, the predictability, and practica-
bility of the complex provisions.5 4 In contrast, other clauses in newly con-
cluded treaties do not conform with European Union law, especially treaties
with less influential EU countries. For example, the recently signed U.S.
treaties with Portugal and Sweden, like the U.S.-German Treaty, completely
ignore non-national EU shareholders where restrictions on ownership are
concerned.55 Therefore, the treatment of EU companies in U.S. limitation
on benefit clauses continues to be vague and unpredictable.56 No clear de-
cal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Feb. 22, 1990, U.S.-Spain, art. 17, reprinted
in 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 8403.35 [hereinafter U.S.-Spanish Treaty].52See U.S.-French Treaty, supra note 51, art. 30; U.S.-Dutch Treaty, supra note 51, art.
26; U.S.-Spanish Treaty, supra note 51, art. 17.
53 See U.S.-French Treaty, supra note 51, art. 30; U.S.-Dutch Treaty, supra note 51, art.
26; U.S.-Spanish Treaty, supra note 51, art. 17. A company owned by a majority of EU
residents can only qualify under these treaties if this EU ownership does not exceed certain
maximum percentages.
54See, e.g., Dirk van Unnik & Maarten Boudesteijn, The New US-Dutch Tax Treaty and
the Treaty of Rome, 1993 EC TAX REv. 106; Franco Gallo & Gaetano Casertano, The Clause
Anti-abuse in the Italian Double Tax Treaties and their Compatibility with the EC Law, 23
INTERTAX 649 (1995); Marco de Lignie, Limitation on Benefits: Recently Signed US Treaties
Compared to the 1992 US-Netherlands Treaty, 49 BULL. INT'L FISCAL Doc. 71 (1995); van
Herksen, supra note 39, at 19; Harrison Cohen et al., Analysis of the New U.S.-Luxembourg
Income Tax Treaty, 25 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 403 (1996); Peter Essers & R.H.M.J. Offer-
manns, Tax Treaties in Conflict with the EC Treaty: The Incompatibility ofAnti-Abuse Pro-
visions and EC Law, 22 I.T.J. 68 (1996); Sugarman, supra note 47, at 823; DeCarlo, supra
note 47, at 271; Clotilde Fournier, U.S.-France Treaty Tightens Limitation of Benefits, Adds
Pension Provisions, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 488, 496 (1994); Michael J. Schinabeck, The Limita-
tion on Benefits Article of the US.-France Tax Treaty, 25 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 26 (1996).5 5See Convention Between the United States of America and the Portuguese Republic for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Sept. 6, 1994, U.S.-Port., art. 17, reprinted in 3 Tax Treaties (CCH)
7803.18; Convention Between the Government of Sweden and the Government of the
United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 1, 1994, U.S.-Swed., art. 17, reprinted in 3
Tax Treaties (CCH) 8801.18. See also de Lignie, supra note 54, at 75-77 (for more in-
formation on these Treaties).
56The most recent invention is a clause in the new tax treaty between the United States
and Switzerland, signed on October 2, 1996 but not yet ratified. Convention Between the
United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 22(1)(f), reprinted in 3
Tax Treaties (CCH) 9101.22 [hereinafter U.S.-Swiss Treaty]. Replacing the traditional
ownership percentage or base erosion tests, this limitation on benefits clause is based on a
"predominant interest" in the company seeking treaty benefits. Compared with prior clauses,
differences in detail mainly concern the danger of base erosion and do not address the own-
ership problem. The clause appears to lack a clear definition of predominant interests. If the
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velopment toward better limitation on benefit clauses appears in sight. At
present, the United States seems unlikely to alter or redefine its unpredict-
able treaty policies concerning the treatment of European companies. 7 A
detailed analysis of the U.S.-German clause reveals its nonconformity with
European Union law and, therefore, provides a more persuasive and appro-
priate means to initiate changes in the U.S. treaty-making policy than would
an analysis of recent clauses that show an attempt to reconcile the differing
opinions.
Third, while other treaties are being renegotiated and equipped with
better limitation on benefit clauses, the U.S.-German Treaty remains un-
changed. To date, no renegotiation is in sight.58  Judicial remedies are
rather ineffective in initiating changes in the Treaty because they cannot di-
rectly attack the Treaty, only an individual taxpayer's tax assessment.5 9
Furthermore, companies do not attempt to have certain corporate structures
approved by the courts if they would potentially run afoul of the anti-treaty
shopping law. Litigation over this issue might be too costly, risky, and
time-consuming. 0 Instead of going to court, taxpayers seem either to alter
the tax structure of their investments and choose safer locations, or they tol-
erate the tax treatment under the Treaty. In addition, Germany is not a low-
tax jurisdiction, so treaty shopping is less attractive and less prominent than
in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions.6' This fact, however, does not eliminate
the possible deterrent effect of the U.S.-German Treaty on companies that
wish to invest in Germany for reasons other than tax treatment.
term is understood in the narrow sense of corporate law, the test will result in the same 50 %
ownership requirement that the U.S.-German Treaty establishes. In light of European Union
law, the new clause will not make a significant difference. See, for a recent discussion,
Harrison J. Cohen et al., Analysis of the New U.S.-Switzerland Income Tax Treaty, 26 TAX
MGMT. INT'L J. 47 (1997); Howard R. Hull, Limitation on Benefits in the New US-
Switzerland Treaty, 51 BuLL. INT'L FiscAL Doc. 2 (1997). The provision in the U.S.-Swiss
Treaty, however, deviates from all U.S. Model Treaties, and its inclusion seems to be a sin-
gular event rather than a new direction in U.S. tax treaty policy. Moreover, Switzerland has
not yet joined the European Union, so it is not bound by the obligations of the EC Treaty, as
Germany and other EU Member States are.57 U.S. treaty policy has been criticized for its deterrent anti-treaty shopping clauses. A
recent study argued that U.S. policy is made without considering the impact on competitive-
ness and the effects of stringent anti-treaty shopping provisions. U.S. Tax Policy Made
Without Considering Impact on Competitiveness, Study Says, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY
(BNA) (Aug. 14, 1996), available in WESTLAW.
58See Fogarasi et al., supra note 31, at 141 (reporting that there is no income tax treaty
under active negotiation between the United States and Germany).
59See infra text accompanying notes 254-60.
60At the time of this writing, no case is pending before the Court of Justice.61However, treaty shopping in Germany can be attractive even from a narrow tax plan-
ning point of view. Due to particularities in the international tax treaty network, high-tax
European countries can offer a preferential way to route investments from the United States
to South America, Africa, or Asia. See Marshall J. Langer, Outbound Treaty Shopping Of-
fers Advantages for US Multinationals, 17 INTERTAX 333 (1989).
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Finally, the U.S.-German Treaty exemplifies the dilemma of whether it
is preferable to regulate treaty shopping on a treaty level or on a national
law level. Deficits in the limitation on benefits clause of this Treaty seem
to impact the interplay between treaty law and German law and create rec-
onciliation difficulties.6 2 The possibility of treaty shopping has resulted in
recent internal tax legislation in Germany. A new section, 50(d)(la), was
added to the German Income Tax Code by the Anti-Abuse and Tax Code
Revision Act of 1993 in order to curtail treaty shopping.63 This new section
requires companies to meet one of two testse4 in order to refute the pre-
sumption of treaty shopping65 and thus be entitled to the benefits of a tax
treaty. The enactment of this section is a legislative reaction to German
case law that sanctioned conduit companies engaged in treaty shopping.
66
62 1n some fields of law, treaty shopping prevention is even stronger at a national law
level than at treaty level. For example, national laws which require adherence to arm's-
length principles of related-party transactions can have a strong deterrent effect on tax eva-
sion. Similarly, stringent debt-equity rules can avoid the abuse of conduit entities for tax
saving purposes.63See Anti-Abuse and Tax Code Revision Act of Dec 21, 1993, Bundesgesetzblatt [Fed-
eral Law Gazette] [BGBI.] 1 1993, at 2310. EStG, § 50(d)(la) has been effective from the
tax assessment period beginning on or after January 1, 1994. EStG, supra note 9, §
50(d)(la). The section provides: "A foreign company is not entitled to tax relief (tax ex-
emption or tax reduction according to § 44(d) or according to a convention for the avoidance
of double taxation) to the extent that individuals hold an interest in it who could not claim
such tax relief if they directly earned the income, and if there are no business or other con-
siderable reasons for interposing such foreign company, and the company does not conduct a
business of its own." Id.
64The tests are structured similar to common limitation on benefits provisions in treaties.
A subjective test requires ownership by persons who are entitled to the treaty themselves,
and an objective test is similar to business conduct tests found in treaties. The tests may be
fulfilled alternatively. Contrary to Article 28 of the U.S.-German Treaty, however, the tests
do not necessarily deny all benefits; instead, they may grant benefits in part. EStG, supra
note 9, § 50(d)(la).65This presumption is based on general German tax law considerations. In principle, tax
authorities face a duty to investigate the relevant facts of a case in the course of assessing tax
debt. Abgabenordnung [General Tax Code] [AO] § 88(1). Once a tax return is filed with
the authorities, they will launch any additional inquiry that is necessary to clarify the return.
In these procedures, the taxpayer has to co-operate with the authorities and provide them
thorough information in order to avoid an estimation of tax debt and an imposition of coer-
cive payments against the taxpayer. AO §§ 90(1), 162, 328, 329. However, in cross-border
cases the burden of producing evidence shifts completely to the taxpayer. AO § 90(2). In
conjunction with EStG § 50(d)(la), the taxpayer is required to discharge itself of the pre-
sumption of treaty shopping.
"Before the enactment of EStG 50(d)(la), the Federal Tax Court applied AO § 42 to
cases of treaty abuse. This section is a general anti-abuse provision and sets out in its first
subsection: "The tax law cannot be circumvented by the abuse of formally admissible ar-
rangements." Id. However, the courts decided that benefit from tax treaties is not abusive if
the taxpayer is a third-country resident, and, therefore, does not directly affect German inter-
nal tax law. The Federal Tax Court, for example, sanctioned a conduit company owned by
Monaco residents for that reason. Bundesfinanzhof [Federal Tax Court] [BFH], Decision of
Oct. 29, 1981, Bundessteuerblatt [Federal Tax Bulletin] [BStBl.] 11 1982, at 150. Reacting
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In practice, however, section 50(d)(la) may deviate from Germany's double
tax treaties because its scope of application overlaps with Article 28 of the
U.S.-German Treaty.67 Although the legislative history of section 50(d)(la)
does not evidence an intention to override treaty obligations, 68 a conflict
between national law and the Treaty is likely.6 9 Against this background, a
U.S.-German Treaty that clearly conflicts with European Union law pro-
vides a strong incentive to harmonize treaty and national anti-abuse law.70
to the decisions of the Federal Tax Court, Article 28 of the U.S.-German Treaty has been in-
creasingly invoked by the German tax authorities and finally led to the enactment of EstG
§ 50(d)(la). EStG, supra note 9, § 50(d)(la). See Lorence, supra note 66, at 126; Helmut
Becker, Treaty Shopping - a German Approach, I J. STRATEGY IN INT'L TAx. 191, 194
(1985).
67Both laws may be applied in a typical treaty shopping situation. See supra Part I.A.68In its hearings, the federal parliament expressed that EStG, supra note 9, § 50(d)(la)
had the same thrust as common anti-abuse provisions in tax treaties and reaffirmed the ob-
jectives of such provisions. Bundestagsdrucksache [Parliamentary Documents] [BT-
Drucks.] 12/5630, Sept. 7, 1993, at 65. Even if this statement could be interpreted as a
commitment to apply the provision only beyond the scope of treaty provisions, it would not
bind tax authorities and tax courts. In addition, the application of the new section is unpre-
dictable, and it has been criticized for its lack of clarity. See Wilhelm Haarmann & Barbara
Busch, New German Anti-Abuse Tax Legislation, 22 INTERTAX 208, 209 (1994).
69As pointed out in a recent decision of the Federal Tax Court, German national law may
deviate from tax treaty obligations and even suspend these obligations because treaties are
subject to unilateral changes by German legislation. Bundesfinanzhof [Federal Tax Court]
[BFI-], Decision of July 13, 1994, Bundessteuerblatt [Federal Tax Bulletin] [BStBI.] 111995,
at 129; see also Hey, supra note 47, at 112; Helmut Becker & Felix Wilrm, Double-taxation
conventions and the Conflict between International Agreements and Subsequent Domestic
Laws, 16 INTERTAX 257, 259 (1988). Such legislative reaction, known as treaty override, is
well-known and widely accepted in the United States. However, treaty override has been
criticized because it clearly contravenes obligations under international law. See, e.g.,
Stephan Eilers, Override of Tax Treaties under the Domestic Legislation of the U.S. and
Germany, 19 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 295 (1990); Richard L. Doemberg, Overriding Tax Trea-
ties: The US. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1995); David Williams, Freedom of
Establishment andDouble Taxation Agreements, 19 EUR. LAW REV. 313, 318 (1994).
7 In general, a harmonization of treaty law and national law concerning treaty shopping
could be accomplished by making the application of national provisions expressly subsidiary
to the existence of similar treaty provisions, or incorporating all anti-abuse law into treaties
and having no national provisions at all. Since the first solution creates problems of defining
the exact scope of application and the second solution is difficult to realize throughout the
world's treaty network, a future U.S.-EU Treaty containing anti-abuse law would be the best
way of harmonization. See infra Part III.C. See also David A. Ward, Abuse of Tax Treaties,
23 INTERTAX 176, 184 (1995) (arguing that anti-abuse provisions should generally be im-
plemented in treaties because then the contracting states have expressly agreed that they can
be applied by either side, and the contracting states have an exact view of the treaty's scope
of application).
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II. ARTICLE 28 OF THE U.S.-GERMAN TREATY IN LIGHT OF THE EC
TREATY
A. The Application of European Union Law
1. Tax Law Harmonization in the European Union
Income tax legislation is largely left to each Member State of the
European Union. The EC Treaty contains no express mandate for harmoni-
zation of income tax laws among the Member States.7' The EC Treaty
does, however, provide a general and basic competence for legal harmoni-
zation which can also be employed to harmonize the Member States' tax
laws.72 To date, harmonization of direct taxes has occurred only in the form
of a few specific directives, each with very limited application.73 Beyond
these directives, direct taxation is completely governed by the tax laws of
the Member States.74
However, the laws of the Member States must be consistent with the
whole body of European Union law.75 National tax law must not contra-
vene any EC Treaty provision as developed and interpreted by the European
71 Harmonization of income taxes, as well as any other direct taxes, is not regulated by
the EC Treaty. Indirect taxes, however, are to be harmonized on the basis of the EC Treaty.
EC TREATY arts. 95-99. This has happened with the Value Added Tax (VAT) which now is,
apart from different tax rates, based on the same system throughout the European Union.
72See EC TREATY art. 100. Article 100 allows harmonization of the laws of the Member
States to the extent that this is required for the efficient functioning of the common market
created by the EC Treaty. See EC TREATY art. 2.
73See, e.g., Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of
taxation applicable to parent companies and their subsidiaries in different Member States,
1990 O.J. (L 225) 6; Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system
of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanging shares con-
cerning companies of different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1; Convention
90/436/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the
adjustments of transfers of profits between associated undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10. A
proposed directive on company and dividend taxation, more general in its application, has
been unsuccessful. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the Harmoni-
zation of Company Taxation and of Withholding Taxes on Dividends, 1975 O.J. (C 253) 2.
These legislative acts harmonize the tax laws of the Member States in certain areas. As di-
rectives, they do not create a genuine "European" tax law but oblige the Member States to
implement the directive, i.e., modify their national law accordingly. See EC TREATY art.
189. Separate national tax laws still exist, but they have been assimilated in their contents by
EU legislation.
74See Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K6ln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-
225, 257, para. 21, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 401, 422, para. 21; Case 270/83, Commission v.
France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 306, para. 24, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 401, 422, para. 24; Case C-
175/88, Klaus Biehl v. Administration des Contributions du Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg,
Opinion Darmon, 1990 E.C.R. 1-1779, 1786, para. 10, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 143, 146-47, para.
10.
75 See Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K6ln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-
225, 1-257, para. 21, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 450,473, para. 21.
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Court of Justice.76 The Court recently reiterated that "the powers retained
by the Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with
Community law...,,7 This obligation is directly derived from the EC
Treaty.
78
2. The Prohibition of Discrimination in the EC Treaty
The EC Treaty seeks to abolish all discrimination against individuals
of Member States on grounds of their nationality.79 This goal is accom-
plished by a general anti-discrimination rule and by other specifically enu-
merated freedoms.80 The specific freedoms in the EC Treaty include the
free movement of goods, the free movement of workers, the freedom of es-
tablishment, the freedom to provide services, and the free movement of
capital and payments.8 l
The general anti-discrimination rule, however, has little effect on the
U.S.-German Tax Treaty because the rule's ambit is very narrow. It has in-
76See id.
77Id.
78See EC TREATY art. 5. This Article generally demands that the Member States comply
with all obligations set out in the Treaty.
79These anti-discrimination rights, however, are no longer confined to individuals of
Member States of the European Union. As of January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area
[hereinafter EEA], a joint market between the EU and the members of the European Free
Trade Association, has been established. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade
Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EFTA]. In this context, the basic
freedoms of the EC Treaty have been extended by the EEA to the EFTA members. Three
former EFTA members, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, became full EU members on January
1, 1995. Therefore, only Norway and Iceland enjoy the basic freedoms of the EC Treaty
without being EU members, together with Liechtenstein which joined the EEA on May 1,
1995. In the context of this analysis, these countries are in the same situation as full EU
members regarding the basic freedoms. However, any nationals from non-EU and non-
EFTA countries, for example U.S. citizens, cannot claim rights under the EC Treaty. Article
8 of the EC Treaty limits the rights conferred by the EC Treaty to citizens of the European
Union, i.e., nationals of any of the Member States. EC TREATY art. 8.
8
°See EC TREATY art. 6. This Article provides in its first paragraph that "within the
scope of application of the Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained
therein, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be prohibited." Id.
"
1See EC TREATY arts. 9-37, 48-51, 52-58, 59-66, 73a-73h. These freedoms were ex-
pected to be implemented pursuant to a specific program, which provided for the abolition of
all national restrictions on the freedoms. That abolition should have taken place during a so-
called transitional period, but the goals of the program have not been fully achieved yet.
However, all freedoms are directly applicable after the transitional period has elapsed, re-
gardless of the extent of EU legislation or other abolishing measures in the field. Case 2/74,
Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631, 652, para. 30, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305, 327, para.
30. The freedoms are "binding" on Member States in the sense that the States are not al-
lowed to legislate contrary to European Union law that has been enacted; however, because
States retain domestic legislative power, they are still able to legislate in areas on which
European Union law has not spoken even though the domestic legislation may be contrary to
EU objectives. Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K6ln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, 1995
E.C.R. 1-225, 1-257, para. 21, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 450, 473, para. 21.
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dependent effect only insofar as the discrimination is not specifically pro-
hibited by one of the enumerated freedoms.8 2 As long as the contested dis-
criminatory law does not contravene an explicitly stated freedom, the Court
of Justice will not apply the general anti-discrimination rule. 3
3. The Effect of European Union Law on National Law as Influenced by
International Treaties
European Union law is applicable to, and binding on, the national law
systems of EU Member States.8 4 The principle of supremacy, which na-
tional courts must follow, ensures that European Union law takes prece-
dence over conflicting national law.8s European Union law also has direct
effect and enjoys supremacy over national law as that national law is modi-
fied or influenced by outside treaties.86 Even if only one party to an inter-
national treaty is a Member State, EU Member States are obligated to
follow the EC Treaty.87 A treaty may also affect the Member State's na-
tional law provisions that are directly affected by the Treaty terms. s In
82See Case 305/87, Commission v. Greece, 1989 E.C.R. 1461, 1477, paras. 13-14, [1991]
I C.M.L.R. 611,622, paras. 13-14.
83See id.84This is established by case law and was first stated in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 13, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 130.
85See Case 106/77, Amniministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A.
(II), 1978 E.C.R. 629, 643-44, paras. 17-23, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263, 283-84, paras. 17-23;
Case C-213/89, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd. (I), 1990
E.C.R. 1-2433,1-2473, para. 20, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 29, para. 20.86See Case 235/87, Annunziata Matteucci v. Communaut6 Frangaise of Belgium, 1988
E.C.R. 5589, 5612, para. 22, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 357, 372, para. 22; Simmenthal (I), 1978
E.C.R. at 643-44, paras. 17-23, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283-84, paras. 17-23; Case 270/83,
Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 307, para. 26, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 401, 423, para.
26; see also Norbert Herzig & Norbert Dautzenberg, Der EWG-Vertrag und die Doppel-
besteuerungsabkommen, 45 DER BErmn [DB] 2519, 2521 (1992); Birgit Bachmann,
Diskriminierungsverbote bei direkten Steuern im Regelungsbereich des EG-Vertrages, 40
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RiW] 849, 858 (1994).87See Case 235/87, Annunziata Matteucci, 1988 E.C.R. at 5612, para. 22, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. at 372, para. 22. However, the relationship between outside treaties and European
Union law is different for treaties concluded before the EC Treaty. As the EC Treaty pro-
vides, those existing treaties shall not be affected by the EC Treaty. EC TREATY art. 234.
The purpose of Article 234 was to facilitate membership in the European Union rather than
impeding it by the existence of treaties concluded before joining the European Union. But
Article 234 was not designed to define the relationship between European Union law obliga-
tions and conflicting treaty obligations. Thus, the provision does not cover the reverse case,
(i.e., conflicts between the EC Treaty and recent double tax treaties), and an argument e
contrario would not be in accordance with the purpose of the provision. See van Unnik &
Boudesteijn, supra note 54, at 106; Hinnekens, supra note 50, at 156 (arguing that the provi-
sion does not eliminate a Member State's obligation to amend its later concluded treaties).
"
8But see van Unnik & Boudesteijn, supra note 52, at 106 (questioning whether interna-
tional treaties are directly affected by European Union law solely aiming at intra-EU situa-
tions).
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concluding a treaty, a Member State subjects itself to treaty obligations and
must follow these obligations in practice. In Germany, tax treaty obliga-
tions are incorporated into national law because German tax law mandates
that double tax treaties shall have predominance over internal law. 9 Obli-
gations at the international law level do not exempt a Member State from
compliance with European Union law, even if national law can still deviate
from these obligations in practice.90 The EC Treaty itself states that Mem-
ber States must fulfill their obligations under European Union law and must
not follow any conflicting law, even if the Member States have otherwise
bound themselves through treaties.9' Also, a lack of, or delay in, legal har-
monization throughout the EU in the field of direct taxation does not entitle
Member States to suspend their obligations under the EC Treaty.92
B. Discrimination by Article 28 of the U.S.-German Treaty
1. Discrimination by the Ownership Percentage Test
a. The Requirements of the Ownership Percentage Test
The ownership percentage test sets up detailed requirements for a tax-
payer to qualify for benefits under the U.S.-German Treaty.93 One require-
89See AO, supra note 65, § 2.
9°See Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 307, para. 26, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 401, 423, para. 26. See also Williams, supra note 69, at 315; H.J. Kamphuis &
F.P.G. P6tgens, Goodbye Mr Bachmann, Welcome Mr Wielockx, 50 BUL. INT'L FIsCAL Doc.
2, 5 (1996).
91 See EC TREATY art. 5 (providing that "Member States shall take all appropriate meas-
ures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall fa-
cilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure
which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.").
'See Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 306, para. 24, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 401,422, para. 24.
93U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(e), 3249.57 [hereinafter ownership per-
centage test]. Article 28 provides that:
1. A person that is a resident of a Contracting State and derives income from the
other Contracting State shall be entitled, in that other Contracting State, to all the
benefits of this Convention only if such person is: a) an individual; b) A Contracting
State, or a political subdivision or local authority thereof; c) engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business in the first-mentioned Contracting State (other than the
business of making or managing investments, unless these activities are banking or in-
surance activities carried on by a bank or insurance company), and the income derived
from the other Contracting State is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, that
trade or business; d) a company in whose principal class of shares there is substantial
and regular trading on a recognized stock exchange; e) aa) a person, more than 50
percent of the beneficial interest in which (or in the case of a company, more than 50
percent of the number of shares of each class of whose shares) is owned, directly or
indirectly, by persons entitled to benefits of this Convention under subparagraphs a),
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ment is that a person must be a resident of one contracting state and derive
income from the other contracting state. This requirement is fulfilled if a
German company receives dividends from its U.S. subsidiary.94 The term
"person" as used in this context includes individuals as well as companies. 9s
The interest in such a company must be owned by a person who, in
turn, must meet one of three requirements: the person must be a resident of
the United States or Germany, a citizen of the United States, or be a com-
pany whose shares are traded on a stock exchange in either of the contract-
ing states.96 In other words, each intermediate owner must also be entitled
to Treaty benefits. Thus, the ultimate owner is always supposed to be an
individual or a company connected to the contracting states. Under the
ownership percentage test, nationals from states other than the United States
or Germany cannot meet this requirement and cannot qualify for the
Treaty.
97
The ownership percentage test requires the ownership, by such per-
sons, of more than a fifty percent beneficial interest in a company.98 The
b), d), or f) or who are citizens of the United States; and bb) a person, more than 50
percent of the gross income of which is not used, directly or indirectly, to meet li-
abilities (including liabilities for interest or royalties) to persons not entitled to bene-
fits of this Convention under subparagraphs a), b), d), or 1) or who are not citizens of
the United States; or f) a not-for-profit organization that, by virtue of that status, is
generally exempt form income taxation in its Contracting State of residence, provided
that more than half of the beneficiaries, members, or participants, if any, in such or-
ganization are persons that are entitled, under this Article, to the benefits of this Con-
vention.
2. A person that is not entitled to the benefits of this Convention pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph 1 may, nevertheless, be granted the benefits of the Conven-
tion if the competent authority of the State in which the income in question arises so
determines.
3. For the purpose of paragraph 1, the term "recognized stock exchange" means:
a) the NASDAQ System owned by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. and any stock exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
as a national securities exchange for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
b) any German stock exchange on which registered dealings in shares take place; c)
any other stock exchange agreed upon by the competent authorities of the Contracting
States.
4. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall consult together
with a view to developing a commonly agreed application of the provisions of this
Article. The competent authorities shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article
26 (Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance), exchange such infor-
mation as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Article and safeguarding,
in cases envisioned therein, the application of their domestic law.
Id. 94 See id.95See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(l)(d), 1 3249.07.96 See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(l)(e), 3249.57.97See id.
9 See id.
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interest is beneficial if it is held by the person to whom the interest is attrib-
utable for tax purposes. 99 Ownership of shares is attributed to the share-
holder for tax purposes.'0 The ownership percentage test mentions both
direct and indirect ownership and thus covers multi-tier structures.0 1 If a
foreign company, incorporated in a third country, creates several fully-
owned dependent corporations each of which is held by a German or U.S.
majority, foreign nationals still own more than fifty percent indirectly, and
the company is disqualified.
A second test set up in Article 28(1)(e)(bb) is conjunctive and must be
fulfilled together with the ownership percentage test.10 2 This "base erosion"
test requires that no more than fifty percent of the taxpayer's gross income
be used to meet liabilities of persons not entitled to Treaty benefits.0 3
b. The Activities Affected by the Ownership Percentage Test
The ownership percentage test impairs a non-German EU firm's busi-
ness decisions in various situations. First, the firm can be affected when it
initially sets up or buys a new company in Germany that does not meet the
ownership percentage qualification. Second, a firm's business strategy is
impeded if an existing company is to be restructured, for example in a
merger, and will no longer qualify after the restructuring because it has lost
its predominant German ownership.1 4 The same result could happen if
previously widespread ownership interests in a firm became concentrated in
"This is analogous to what the Protocol to the Treaty provides for purposes of Article
10, namely that the source country'will deem an income recipient resident in the other coun-
try to be the beneficial owner if the recipient is the person to whom the income is attributable
for tax purposes under the laws of the source country. Protocol, supra note 1. The term
"beneficial" is relevant in characterizing hybrid entities for treaty purposes. In the context of
a stock corporation, it is not of importance. For the meaning of the term in tax treaties, see
generally Cohen, supra note 54, at 405; Michael Cooper, Interpretation of "Beneficial
Owner" under U.S. Tax Treaties, 13 TAX NoTEs INT'L 1319 (1996); Jtirgen Killius, The
Concept of "Beneficial Ownership" of Items of Income under German Tax Treaties, 17
INTERTAX 340 (1989).
1'°This conclusion also follows from the German General Tax Code. See AO, supra
note 65, § 39(1).
""See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(I)(e), 3249.57.
102 See id.
'03 See id. This test avoids treaty shopping by obligees and equity holders. For example,
if third country nationals arrange for nationals of the contracting states to own 100% of the
corporation, they may try to capitalize the corporation by making loans. This is a mere cor-
porate shell and does not meet the base erosion test. Meeting only the base erosion test is
not sufficient. The ownership percentage test must be fulfilled in any case.
1
"The process to regain predominant ownership can only be initiated by owners of the
company or third persons, not by the company itself. In contrast to reacquisition of shares
by a corporation under U.S. law, German companies are usually not allowed to repurchase
their own shares, unless they can prove one of the narrowly specified reasons for doing so.
Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act] [AktG] §§ 70-71e; Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaf-
ten mit beschrankter Haftung [Close Corporation Act] [GmbHG] § 33.
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one, or a few foreign hands.'05 A company set up in Germany and qualified
for Treaty benefits cannot easily be sold, or can be sold only at a potentially
lower value with existing majority-German ownership, because purchasers
from abroad risk losing these benefits, resulting in a lower value for the
company.
c. The Freedom of Establishment under the EC Treaty
(1) The Rule of Article 52 with Respect to Nationality Percentages
The freedom of establishment guaranteed in Article 52 of the EC
Treaty is relevant to treaty shopping situations. 6 Article 52 guarantees
nationals of any EU Member State the freedom "to take up and pursue ac-
tivities," including setting up and managing companies, in any Member
State under the same conditions as those which apply to the second Member
State's nationals.0 7 Simply stated, Article 52 requires every Member State
to treat nationals of other Member States the same as it treats its own na-
tionals.
Article 58 of the EC Treaty extends the rights in Article 52 to any form
of business association or legal entity formed under the law of a Member
State and which has its registered office, administration, or place of busi-
ness within the European Union.'0 8 Individuals as well as companies enjoy
'
05This might be different if, in the case of a corporation, ownership is represented by
shares in the corporation, and these shares are substantially and regularly traded on a stock
exchange. Then, the corporation might pass the stock exchange test of Article 28(1)(d) of
the U.S.-German Treaty. U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(d), 3249.57. This,
however, cannot eliminate discriminatory effects of any of the other tests. See infra Part
II.C.4.b.
'See EC TREATY art. 52. Article 52 provides:
within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State
shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transitional period. Such
progressive abolition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory
of any other Member State. Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take
up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage under-
takings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 58, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the




'" See EC TREATY art. 58 (providing that "companies or firms formed in accordance with
the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or prin-
cipal place of business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States. 'Companies
or firms' means companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including co-
185
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the freedom of establishment.10 9 Therefore, it makes no difference whether
the EU entities that own a German company are individuals or companies
themselves. In the context of discrimination based on nationality, the "na-
tionality" of a company is its registered office.110 Under Article 58, in
conjunction with Article 52, companies from EU countries must be treated
by other EU countries as domestic companies.
Article 221 of the EC Treaty concerns the freedom of establishment
with respect to shareholders' investment of capital in a company."' Even if
nationals of other Member States do not intend to establish themselves in
the concerned country but merely intend to hold shares of a company in that
country, they shall be treated equally with respect to their participation in
the capital of such a company."' Thus, a European company that operates
an independent subsidiary in Germany is covered by Article 52 via Article
221 because the European company holds the subsidiary by owning its
shares."
3
The ownership percentage test is disadvantageous to nationals of other
EU Member States and violates the guaranteed freedoms of Article 52. It is
possible under the U.S.-German Treaty to establish a foreign-owned com-
pany in Germany, because the test does not prohibit the establishment of a
business. Every EU national is free either to own a German corporation
.completely or to share ownership with German nationals. Yet, non-German
EU nationals who establish a company in Germany do so under conditions
less favorable than those faced by German-owned companies; such a com-
pany is not entitled to the benefits of the Treaty unless it limits its owner-
ship by non-German EU nationals to a minority share. As a German-owned
corporation need not do this, non-German EU nationals are not treated
equally to German nationals. 1 4 Thus, a foreign-owned company" 5 cannot




0 See Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 304, para. 18, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 401, 420, para. 18. This view about the "nationality" of a company is mainly
based upon the civil law concept that a company's principal place of business must be at the
same place where the company is registered in order to grant a company corporate status in
the state of registration. See supra note 43.
..See EC TREATY art. 221 (providing that "within three years of the entry into force of
this Treaty, Member States shall accord nationals of the other Member States the same
treatment as their own nationals as regards participation in the capital of companies or firms




3 In contrast, a branch or office of this company would be directly covered by Article 52
in conjunction with Article 58 of the EC Treaty.
114In the context of European Union law, it is irrelevant that these non-nationals are also
not treated equally to U.S. nationals because this concern is beyond the application of the
freedoms guaranteed in the EC Treaty.
15 "Foreign owned" in this comment refers to ownership by non-German EU nationals.
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freely choose its ownership structure. The Court of Justice pointed out in
Commission v. France that a company faces discrimination if it cannot
choose the legal nature of a secondary establishment without losing the
benefit of a tax credit which is substantially the same as losing treaty bene-
fits.116 The same is true if a company cannot choose its ownership structure
without losing tax treaty benefits.
Discrimination affects both partly and fully foreign-owned companies.
While discriminatory effects upon a purely foreign-owned company seem
clear, they are less obvious in the case of mixed ownership because German
owners of the company are subject to the same tax disincentives as non-
German owners. Therefore, tax authorities may argue that there is no spe-
cific discrimination against non-German EU nationals in denying the com-
pany the preferential tax treatment because German minority shareholders
also suffer from that denial.
This argument, however, is irrelevant under European Union law.
Whether the disqualified company is fully-owned by non-German EU na-
tionals or partially owned by Germans cannot be the decisive factor for the
question of discrimination because, under Article 52, in conjunction with
Article 58, the choice of the ownership structure of an establishment is
protected.'
More importantly, the entire company, and not just a single share-
holder, must qualify for the Treaty. As far as the company is concerned, the
German minority owners who disqualify the company are not directly ad-
dressed by the ownership percentage test.118 Even if the ownership percent-
age test differentiates between the shareholders' nationalities, those
shareholders are only indirectly affected on an economic level because their
company is less profitable due to a higher tax debt.
Moreover, the ownership percentage test is based not on nationality per
se, but on a nationality percentage. However, the Court of Justice has al-
ready held that such nationality percentage requirements are discriminatory.
In Agegate,n 9 U.K. law provided that, in order to obtain fishing registration
1 6Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 305, para. 22, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 401,422, par. 22.
1 7 See id.
"
8 Therefore, the German shareholders are not in a situation of reverse discrimination
(discrimination a rebours). Reverse discrimination means that, as a purely internal matter,
nationals are treated worse than non-nationals, which, however, is not prohibited by the EC
Treaty because it is outside the EC Treaty's scope of application. Case 175/78, Regina v.
Saunders, 1979 E.C.R. 1129, 1135, paras. 11-12, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 216, 227, paras. 11-12;
Case 204/87, Bekaert v. Procureur de la Republique, 1988 E.C.R. 2029, 2039, para. 12,
[1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 655, 660, para. 12; Joined Cases C-29-35/94, Ministere Public v. Auber-
tin & Others, 1995 E.C.R. 1-301,1-316, para. 9, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 11, para. 9.
"
9 Case C-3/87, Regina v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food exparte Agegate
Ltd., 1989 E.C.R. 4459, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 366. See also Case C-216/87, Regina v. Minis-
try of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food exparte Jaderow Ltd., 1989 E.C.R. 4509, [1991] 2
C.M.L.R. 556.
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and licenses in the United Kingdom, at least seventy-five percent of the
crew members of British fishing vessels must have British nationality or
that of another country of the Community. The Court held that Community
law does not preclude a Member State from stating such a requirement."O
But the Court also ruled that a Member State is not allowed to require that a
percentage of the crew of the vessels must reside ashore in the concerned
Member State.
121
Later in Factortame,122 the issue was also U.K. legislation providing
that a fishing vessel must, in order to be eligible for registration, be at least
seventy-five percent British-owned, managed from the United Kingdom,
and that the charterers, managers, or operators must be British nationals
resident and domiciled in the United Kingdom, or British companies owned
by at least seventy-five percent British nationals. The Court held that all
these conditions, except the requirement to be managed from the United
Kingdom, were contrary to Article 52 of the EC Treaty, regardless of their
actual discriminatory extent.123
Despite factual differences, the rule from these cases applies to the
ownership percentage test although the rule was derived from a different le-
gal context. The cases differ from the ownership percentage test in their re-
sults regarding the nationality requirements. While in both cases the
nationality percentage was an essential requirement to attain registration
and operate a business at all, the percentage required in the ownership per-
centage test is only a standard for granting or denying a preferential treat-
ment and does not forbid a company's establishment per se. The Agegate
decision also differs from the ownership percentage test insofar as the em-
ployees' nationality was decisive.124 But this aspect was overruled in Fac-
tortame where the concept of corporate ownership, similar to that in the125 atoownership percentage test, was at issue. The nationality requirement in
Factortame also covered the management structure and the place from
where the company is managed, and was therefore more far-reaching than
the ownership percentage test.
126
The ownership percentage test is analogous to the main point in both
these cases, i.e., that a nationality percentage is not a valid criterion for dif-
ferential treatment. The reason is that percentage requirements do not take
into account individual differences, based on nationality, that could make a
120See Agegate, 1989 E.C.R. at 4502, para. 21, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 395, para. 21.
121 See id., 1989 E.C.R. at 4502-03, paras. 22-26, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 395-396, paras.
22-26.
122 Case C-221/89, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport x parte Factortame Ltd.
(II), 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589.
12
'See Factortame (I), 1991 E.C.R. at 1-3967, para. 33, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 628, para.
33.
'
24Agegate, 1989 E.C.R 4459, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 366.
"'Factortame (II), 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589.
126 See id.
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measure less discriminatory. The percentage requirements in the cases as
well as in the ownership percentage test are unconditional and do not pro-
vide for any exceptions or alternatives. They are stripped down to pure na-
tionality-based preferences which are contrary to the core freedoms of the
EC Treaty.
It is irrelevant that the actual discrimination in Factortame was greater
than discrimination under the ownership percentage test. This difference
stems from the fact that the Member States, based on EC directives, have
the power, and are even encouraged, to limit the capacity of their fishing
fleets.127 In contrast, Member States who seek to abolish treaty shopping
cannot rely on that basis because, as European Union law presently stands,
a Member State's interest in treaty shopping protection is not specifically
safeguarded by European Union law. Thus, discriminatory effects were
stronger in the cases concerning fishing vessels than they typically are in a
treaty shopping prevention clause situation, because restrictive measures
were, to some extent, legally authorized by EU legislation. Moreover, less
favorable treatment is sufficient to affect a company's economic freedom
and influence its decision of where to establish. 12 Although establishment
of a company need not be totally impossible, the company faces discrimi-
natory effects under EU legislation. Therefore, the result in Factortame
was independent of the details of the particular discriminatory measures and
applies to the discriminatory ownership percentage test.
Finally, the economic background of the Agegate and Factortame
cases is similar to the problem of treaty shopping. In both cases, the na-
tional law that was found to be discriminatory intended to make "quota-
hopping" less attractive, i.e., it sought to prevent fishing vessels from reg-
istering in a Member State of their choice to exploit this Member State's
fishing quotas. 129 This discriminatory law is similar to treaty shopping pro-
visions because both are based on the idea of limiting preferences, and nei-
ther takes into account possible benefits from the action it seeks to
prevent. 30 If the discriminatory ownership percentage test or any similar
test in other tax treaties were to be examined by the Court of Justice, the
Court might not only regard it as discriminatory for reasons laid out earlier
but might specifically base its finding on its established case law on fishing
quotas.
127 See Agegate, 1989 E.C.R. 4459,4500, para. 17, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 366, 394, para. 17;
Factortame (II), 1991 E.C.R. at 1-3963-64, para. 17 [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 625-26, para. 17.
128See Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wijrttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, 1-1697,
para. 32.
"
2 9SeeAgegate, 1989 E.C.R. 4459, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 366; Factortame (I), 1991 E.C.R.
1-3905, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589.
13 Interestingly, the prevention of quota hopping is, from a public policy standpoint,
criticized for almost the same reasons as treaty shopping prevention. See R. R. Churchill,
Quota Hopping: The Common Fisheries Policy Wrongfooted, 27 CoMMoN MKT. L. REv.
209, 243-47 (1990).
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(2) The Lack of a De Minimis Rule
No de minimis rule can eliminate the discriminatory character of the
ownership percentage test. A de minimis argument evaluates the overall tax
burden on a disqualified company and asserts that this burden would not
considerably increase if no benefits are granted. Without the U.S.-German
Treaty benefits, however, the tax rate would be six times higher than the
rate available under the Treaty.13 1 This discriminatory difference cannot be
regarded as de minimis.
Assuming the U.S.-German Treaty contains smaller tax rate differ-
ences after a future renegotiation, or that other treaties between the United
States and individual Member States of the EU lead to smaller and negligi-
ble differences in a situation comparable to the one under this Treaty, the
Court of Justice would still not apply a de minimis rule. The Court gener-
ally rejects de minimis rules. In particular, the Court rejected such a rule in
either the Agegate and Factortame cases which dealt with discriminatory
measures comparable to the ownership percentage tests. 132 In cases dealing
with Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty, which provide for the free move-
ment of goods, 133 the Court expressly stated that these provisions are not
subject to a de minimis exception. For example, in Commission v. Greece,
the Court held there is no requirement that restrictive effects on the free
movement of goods actually arise. 134 Later, in Commission v. United King-
dom, the Court pronounced that even if restrictive rules were of minor im-
portance in practice, no de minimis principle could save them from the
application of Articles 30 and 36.135 It can be argued that the prohibition in
Article 30 already implies a serious and more than negligible obstacle to
trade between Member States. More importantly, in Leclerc-Siplec, it was
argued that the introduction of a de minimis test might induce national
courts, which have primary responsibility for applying Article 30, to ex-
clude too many restrictive measures from the scope of the prohibition laid
down by that Article. 136 These same arguments also apply to the freedom of
establishment. In Kraus, the Court developed the general formula that
measures "liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the basic
131 See supra notes 8, 11 and accompanying text.
132 See Exparle Agegate, 1989 E.C.R. 4459, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 366; Case C-221/89, Re-
gina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd. (II), 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589.
133 See EC TREATY arts. 30, 36.
134 Case 124/85, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 1986 E.C.R. 3935, 3948, para. 7,
[1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 518, 526, para. 7.
135Case C-30/90, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1992 E.C.R. 1-829, 1-864, 866, para.
15,25 [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 709, 758-60, para. 15,25.
136See Case C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicitd and M6 Publicit6, Opinion Jacobs,
1995 E.C.R. 1-179, 1-195-96, para. 42, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 422,439, para. 42.
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freedoms" are discriminatory.137 Therefore, the threshold for measures to
be discriminatory is very low, and allowing a de minimis exception to the
freedom of establishment would undermine this freedom. Accordingly, the
Court held in Commission v. France that "Article 52 prohibits all discrimi-
nation, even if only of a limited nature. 138
(3) Interpretation of "Residence" in the Contracting States
Discrimination under the U.S.-German Treaty occurs because compa-
nies must be owned by persons entitled to the benefits, i.e., residents of the
United States and Germany.139 A broad interpretation of "residence" that
would also cover residents of EU Member States would resolve the conflict
with European Union law. That interpretation, however, is only possible
under European Union law and not under national law.
European Union law allows a broad construction of legal terms. This
well-established principle of interpretation of European Union law is a spe-
cific teleological approach that is intended to accomplish the objectives of
the EC Treaty to the largest possible extent (effet utile).40 Instead of em-
ploying a literal or strict interpretation, provisions of the EC Treaty may be
construed according to the general objectives set out in the preamble and
Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty. 141 Each provision is interpreted not on its
own but in the larger context of European Union law.1 42 The most liberal
interpretation that effectuates the objectives of European Union law is pre-
ferred. 143 In this context, an application of the effet utile principle would
lead to a broad construction of "residence" in the sense that it would cover
not only German and U.S. nationals but all nationals of the Member States
of the European Union. This construction would solve the problem of dis-
crimination against EU nationals by treating them equally, and, therefore,
would effectuate the freedom of establishment.
Yet, interpretation principles under national law lead to different re-
sults. An interpretation that contravenes the clear wording of a treaty is not
legitimate. Under most national laws, interpretation focuses first on the
natural meaning or usage of the words. 44 Even if the meaning or usage is
137Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wiirttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, 1-1697, para.
32.
138Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 305, para. 21, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 401,421, para. 21.
139 See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(e), 3249.57.
14See, e.g., Case 187/87, Saarland v. Minister for Industry, 1988 E.C.R. 5013, 5042,
para. 19, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 529, 542, para. 19.
14 1 See Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, para. 4, [1970]
C.M.L.R. 112,118, para. 4.
142See Case 283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. Sri v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3430, para.
20, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472,491, para. 20.
141See Stauder, 1969 E.C.R. at 425, par. 4, [1970] C.M.L.R. at 118, para. 4.
144See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
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unambiguous, construction can take into account the objective and purpose
of the provision and, therefore, can deviate from its words to a certain ex-
tent. However, these general and unilateral principles do not apply to the
interpretation of tax treaties.145 The German Federal Tax Court has pointed
out that the principle of state sovereignty calls for a restrictive application
of interpretation principles in the context of international conventions. 146 A
treaty cannot be interpreted in contravention of its explicit and unambigu-
ous wording, and tax authorities have to abide by this wording. 147 As a re-
sult, there is no authority for a broader interpretation of the term
"residence" covering EU nationals in general, because this term is clearly
defined in the U.S.-German Treaty.
German tax authorities thus face a conflict between the two different
standards for interpretation. They cannot follow their interpretation obliga-
tions under European Union law and at the same time comply with a differ-
ent interpretation standard for treaties as prescribed by the German
courts.148 A practical argument against a treaty application that goes be-
yond the treaty wording is that such a reading would lead to bilateral con-
flicts on a political level.1 49 A unilateral broad interpretation of a treaty by a
European country would damage that country's international reputation,
undermine the U.S. treaty policy, and ultimately provoke the United States
and other treaty partners to terminate existing treaties. Although these ter-
minations would open the doors to renegotiation and perhaps reconciliation
with European Union law, it would also lead to an unpredictable tax situa-
tion between the United States and European countries. Even if the U.S.-
German Treaty continued to exist after a unilateral breach, economic con-
sequences would follow. 5 ° It is likely that the tax authorities will comply
with the traditional treaty interpretation methods and will not apply the
U.S.-German Treaty against its clear wording.'5 ' Although there is no for-
mal system of binding precedents in Germany, German tax authorities usu-
ally follow the Federal Tax Court's decisions. The tax authorities also lack
the ability to directly invoke a ruling by the Court of Justice on this matter.
The issue must be dealt with, if at all, before national courts and only later
145 See, e.g., Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT'L TAX &
Bus. LAW. 1, 29-33 (1986) (comparing tax treaty interpretation principles with the interpre-
tation of domestic statutes).
146See Bundesfinanzhof [Federal Tax Court] [BFH], Decision of Sept. 13, 1972, Bun-
dessteuerblatt [Federal Tax Bulletin] [BStBI.] 111973, at 57.
147 See id.
141 See id.
149See Becker & Wtirm, supra note 69, at 262-63 (pointing out the political conse-
quences of a breach of a double taxation agreement).
'
50 See id. at 262.
'
51 See also Norbert Dautzenberg, Die Wegzugssteuer des § 6 AStG im Lichte des EG-
Rechts, 52 BErIEBs-BERATER 180, 184 (1997) (discussing the tax authorities' possible re-
actions to rules incompatible with European Union law).
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before the Court of Justice.15 2  In sum, it is unlikely that German tax
authorities will grant benefits based on a broad construction of the U.S.-
German Treaty.
d. The Freedom of Capital Movement under the EC Treaty
The ownership percentage test also causes discrimination against free
movement of capital. Article 73b of the EC Treaty guarantees the free
movement of capital and payments. 53 To the extent that establishing, oper-
ating, buying, selling, or merging a company requires the investment of
capital, the free movement of capital is affected by the ownership percent-
age test. If non-nationals, individuals as well as companies, buy shares in a
German company, they could disqualify this company from receiving
Treaty benefits, and, accordingly, they would suffer tax disadvantages.
Thus, their investment may be discriminated against compared to the in-
vestment of Treaty nationals. This treatment amounts to discrimination
against non-nationals based on the situs of their capital investment.
Yet, Article 73b of the EC Treaty has no independent meaning in this
situation because Article 52, the freedom of establishment clause, is pri-
marily relevant. Both discrimination against the freedom of establishment
and the free movement of capital occurs in this case. The Court held in
Bachmann'54 that Article 73b does not prohibit restrictions that result indi-
rectly from restrictions on other basic freedoms. For a company disquali-
fied from the Treaty, not only the flow of capital as such is obstructed, but
also the purpose of the investment itself and the tax considerations on the
company level.
2. The Role of Discretionary Relief under Article 28
Companies that do not fall within the scope of Article 28(1) of the
Treaty may instead receive preferential tax treatment on the basis of a dis-
cretionary decision under Article 28(2). 155 But even if the company com-
mences proceedings for discretionary relief under the Treaty, the
discrimination continues because these proceedings do not guaranty auto-
152 See infra text accompanying notes 254-59.
153 See EC TREATY art. 73b. Article 73b provides as follows:
1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions
on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and
third countries shall be prohibited. 2. Within the framework of the provisions set out
in this Chapter, all restrictions on payments between Member States and between
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.
Id.
'4Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgian State, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249, 1-285, para. 34,
[1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 785, 810, para. 34. The case dealt with Article 67 of the EC Treaty, the
former provision on the freedom of capital, which was replaced by Article 73b with effect
from January 1, 1994. EC TREATY art. 73b.
155 See supra note 93 for the text of Article 28(2).
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matic qualification.15 6 The authorities of the State in which the income
arises are allowed to grant Treaty benefits even if the tests of Article 28(1)
are not satisfied. For a German company receiving dividends from the
United States, the competent authority is the Secretary of the Treasury or
his delegate.
157
The criteria for a discretionary decision are laid out in a Memorandum
supplementing the U.S.-German Treaty. 158 A German corporation that has
been denied Treaty benefits due to a predominance of foreign shareholders
may be eligible for discretionary relief on the basis of this Memorandum.
The Memorandum states how the competent authority should exercise its
discretion. The authority is supposed to take into account "all relevant facts
and circumstances."'159 The Memorandum commits the authority to consid-
ering the objectives of the European Union160 and the views of the tax
authorities of its Member States.
16
Since this part of the Memorandum refers to the problem of EU owner-
ship interests in companies, discretionary relief will probably be granted to
a German company discriminated against because of predominantly non-
German EU shareholders. However, the decision to grant relief is discre-
tionary because it is the authority that decides whether to grant benefits at
all and to what extent, 62 not the Treaty provision itself. There is no speci-
fied legal claim or entitlement for discretionary relief under Article 28(2).
As the wording of the Treaty unmistakably indicates, entities qualifying un-
der Article 28(1) "shall be entitled" to benefits; whereas under Article
156 See Helmut Becker & Otmar Th6mmes, Treaty Shopping und EG-Recht-Kritische
Anmerkungen zu Art. 28 des neuen deutsch-amerikanischen Doppelbesteuerungsabkom-
mens, 44 DER BErRIEB 566, 567 (1991); Stephan Eilers & Maureen Watkins Briigmann, Ar-
ticle 28 of the German-US Double Taxation Treaty of 1989: An appropriate Solution to the
Treaty Shopping Problem?, 20 TAX PLANNING INT'L REV. 15, 21 (1993).
157See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(i)(aa), 3249.07.
158 See Understandings Regarding the Scope of the Limitation on Benefits Article in the
Convention Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America,
Aug. 29, 1989, reproduced in Technical Explanation, supra note 1 [hereinafter Memoran-
dum].
159 See id.
16°The Memorandum provides that "the discretionary authority granted to the competent
authorities in paragraph 2 is particularly important in view of, and should be exercised with
particular cognizance of, the developments in, and objectives of, international economic in-
tegration, such as that between the member countries of the European Communities and
between the United States and Canada." Id.
16' The Memorandum provides that "the competent authorities will consult further on
these issues, and may also take into account the views of the tax authorities of other States,
including, in particular, Member States of the European Communities." Id.
'
62The Memorandum does not mention whether discretionary relief always equals a full
Treaty qualification under Article 28(1). Therefore, it is possible that benefits are not
granted to the full extent, so that the company ends up with a tax rate between the regular
rate and the preferential Treaty rate.
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28(2), benefits may be granted to persons "not entitled."'163 Also, the com-
petent authorities are not compelled to consider the factors mentioned in the
Memorandum. The Memorandum is merely a separate document and not
part of the Treaty because no reference to it is made in the Treaty. The pur-
pose of the Memorandum is to further explain the more detailed Treaty
provisions, not to modify them.6' The authority cannot be forced to decide
in favor of a discriminatorily treated taxpayer. Therefore, the considera-
tions in the Memorandum are not sufficient by themselves to qualify under
Article 28.165 Even if the Memorandum were part of the Treaty and legally
binding, it would only give general guidance to an authority rather than
clear-cut factors to be taken into account by the authority in exercising its
discretion. This scenario holds true despite optimism about the Treaty
Memorandum at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty. The negotiators
of the Treaty expected a considerable number of cases to be preferably de-
cided under the discretionary relief procedure in order not to discourage in-
vestors by the tests of Article 28(1), and they also stated their intention to
review the boundary line between Articles 28(1) and 28(2) at a later
stage. 66 To date, however, this review has not occurred, and this mere in-
tention does not create legal rights.
Apart from these uncertainties in the results, the procedure to obtain
discretionary relief also creates practical disadvantages in terms of time and
costs. Reliable and predictable results in the assessment of tax debt may
only be expected from a qualification for Treaty benefits under Article
28(1), not from a discretionary decision. An application for qualification
under Article 28(2) is more costly and time-consuming than a qualification
qua lege.167 Regardless of its results, the procedure for discretionary relief
puts a company at a formal disadvantage. A revenue procedure by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury deals with the procedural details of requesting
163 U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28, 3249.57.
'6The Memorandum is designed to give guidance to taxpayers and tax authorities, and
to allow the competent authorities to develop "further understandings and interpretations."
Memorandum, supra note 158.
165 See Becker & Thimmes, supra note 156, at 567; Debatin, supra note 46, at 661. See
also van Herksen, supra note 40, at 26 (making the same argument for a similar clause in the
U.S.-Dutch Treaty).
166See Memorandum, supra note 158. See also Mimi E. Gild, Note, Tax Treaty Shop-
ping: Changes in the U.S. Approach to Limitation on Benefits Provisions in Developing
Country Treaties, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 553, 594 (1990); Jonathan Kim, The U.S.-West German
Income Tax Treaty: Can Article 28's Limitation on Benefits Serve as a Model for the Treas-
ury's Anti-Treaty Shopping Policy?, 43 TAX LAw. 983, 1000 (1990).
167The qualification is achieved qua lege because it does not require an advance compe-
tent authority ruling or approval but is self-executing, as the Memorandum to the Treaty
points out regarding Article 28(1)(c). See Memorandum, supra note 158. Therefore, a com-
pany's qualification under Article 28(1) will automatically be considered in the notice of tax
assessment. Conversely, a qualification for Treaty benefits based upon discretionary relief
will take time while the competent authority decides whether to grant such a qualification.
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discretionary relief when the competent authority is the U.S. Treasury. 68
The revenue procedure provides that no advance determination by the
authority is permitted and no positive ruling on qualification for Treaty
benefits will be provided; only rulings on non-qualification will be given./9
Therefore, the taxpayer has no opportunity to thoroughly plan the tax situa-
tion based on the authority's determination. If the corporate structure has
already been established, no verification by the authority takes place until
the tax is assessed. Thus, the tax has already been paid and must be re-
funded after relief is granted. This refund results in a financial disadvan-
tage in terms of the company's liquidity and interest payments.
The procedure to obtain discretionary relief is contrary to explicit case
law of the Court of Justice. As the Court emphasized in Factortame, the
mere fact that competent authorities are empowered to grant exemptions or
dispensations from the application of a discriminatory national law does not
eliminate the discriminatory content of the measure, even if the power in
question is in fact freely applied. 170 Thus, the ownership percentage test
leads to discrimination against non-nationals and restricts their freedom of
establishment.
1 71
C. Possible Arguments for Justification
A review of the Court's case law shows that there is no possible justifi-
cation for the restriction caused by the limitation on benefits clause. Since
no litigation against the provision in dispute has yet been brought before the
Court, possible justifications employed in other cases must be analyzed.
1. Fiscal Residence
Reference to the taxpayer's fiscal residence as a criterion for differen-
tiation is an invalid defense. The criterion for residence can be rather simi-
lar to that of nationality in its practical results. Therefore, discrimination
based on residence can only be justified if there is an objective difference
between residents and non-residents.
168 See Rev. Proc. 96-13, 1996-3 I.R.B. 31. See also Patricia R. Lesser, Access to Tax
Treaty Benefits: Procedural Aspects, 17 TAX MGMT. INT'L FORUM 38,43-44 (1996).
169See Rev. Proc. 96-13, 1996-3 I.R.B. 31. In contrast, the Memorandum permits ad-
vance determinations. See Memorandum, supra note 158.
170 Case C-221/89, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd.
(11), 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905, 1-3968-69, paras. 37-39, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589, 629-30, paras. 37-
39; see also Case 27/80, Fietie, 1980 E.C.R. 3839, 3854-55, para. 14, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R.
722, 739-40, para. 14.
171 See P611ath, supra note 46, at 178; Eilers & Brilgmann, supra note 156, at 19-20; J6rg
M6ssner, Anti-Abuse Provisions in the German Tax Treaties, in Essers & Offermanns, supra
note 54, at 76-77.
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The Court dealt with fiscal residence as a justification for discrimina-
tory measures in Commerzbank.1 72 A bank with residence in Germany
mistakenly overpaid taxes levied by the United Kingdom on the German
bank's U.S. source income. Yet, this income was exempt from taxation un-
der the U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty because the requirement of U.K. residence
was not met. The bank was repaid the net amount of the overpayment. The
United Kingdom failed to pay interest on that amount, the so-called repay-
ment supplement, because the U.K. Income and Corporation Taxes Act
1988 restricted this supplement to U.K. resident companies.173 After con-
sidering the unequal treatment of resident and non-resident companies, the
Court held that the provision was discriminatory because most non-resident
companies were foreign companies whereas U.K. companies could easily
meet the residence requirement. 74
In Schumacker' 75 a taxpayer worked in Germany but lived in Belgium.
According to a tax treaty between Germany and Belgium, he was taxed in
Germany. As a non-resident, he was not allowed tax benefits to the same
extent as a resident of Germany. Again, the Court held that in most in-
stances, residents and non-residents were not in comparable situations but
that in this case their situation was comparable and led to an unjustified in-
fingement 1
76
Under the ownership percentage test, the Treaty qualification of the
company is derived from the residence of the ultimate owners in the con-
tracting states. However, the Treaty does not set up different rules for resi-
dents and non-residents similar to national tax laws. Instead, only resident
companies can qualify, and the Treaty is irrelevant for non-resident compa-
nies. So the treatment of resident and non-resident companies does not dif-
fer on the basis of their nationality.
2. Cohesion of the Tax System
A justification for the ownership percentage test based on maintaining
the cohesion of the U.S.-German Treaty also fails to support the Treaty's
discriminatory effects. The cohesion of a tax system is a concept developed
172Case C-330/91, Regina v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Commerzbank
AG, 1993 E.C.R. 1-4017, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 457.
173 See id.
174 See Commerzbank, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-4044, paras. 18-20, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 474,
paras. 18-20.
175Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K61n-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225,
[1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 450. This decision was followed in other cases. See Case C-80/94,
Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2493, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 85;
Case C-107/94, Asscher v. Staatssecretaris Van Financidn, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3089, [1996] 3
C.M.L.R. 61.
176See Schumacker, 1995 E.C.L at 1-266, para. 58, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 479, para. 58.
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by the Court. 177 It allows Member States to treat EU nationals worse than
domestic taxpayers in order to maintain a balanced tax law system. Cohe-
sion attempts to keep the balance of the tax system on a technical level.
Characterization of tax-relevant items should be the same throughout a tax
system. If, for example, income characterization and deduction allowance
cannot be offset because the facts of a particular case allow special provi-
sions designed for non-nationals, the technical balance of the system may
be at danger.
In the Bachmann case,178 the Court of Justice used the principle of co-
hesion for the first time. A German national working in Belgium sought
deductions for various insurance premiums he had paid to German insur-
ance companies but was only allowed to deduct premiums paid to Belgian
insurance companies. According to the Belgian tax code, premiums were
only deductible if the proceeds of the insurance policies were subject to
Belgian taxation. The Court held that this was an infringement on the tax-
payer.179 Yet, the Court recognized that the cohesion of the Belgian tax
system would be endangered, if the deductions in dispute did not corre-
spond with taxable income from their proceeds. So, the Court ruled that the
infringement was sufficiently justified because it was impossible to ensure
the cohesion of the national tax system by means of measures that were less
restrictive.1
80
In the Wieloclcc case,18 1 the Court extended the principle of cohesion to
tax treaties. The EC Treaty does not prohibit Member States from con-
cluding tax treaties with each other and even encourages such behavior.
Article 220 provides that Member States shall enter into negotiations with
the goal of abolishing double taxation within the European Union. As the
Court pointed out, bilateral cohesion reached by operation of tax treaties
prevented a Member State from pleading the defense of cohesion on a na-
tional level.8 2 A tax treaty therefore is an acceptable means of ensuring
cohesion of national tax laws.
Regarding the ownership percentage test, however, the cohesion of the
U.S. or German tax system is not at stake. Tax treaties are different from
national tax laws because treaties have no underlying cohesion them-
177See Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgian State, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249, 1-282-83, paras.
21-27, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 785, 808-09, paras. 21-27.
178Bachmann, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 785.
179See id. In this case, Article 48 of the EC Treaty, providing for the free movement of
workers, was affected. However, the same considerations apply to situations under Article
52 of the EC Treaty.
"
0
°See Bachmann, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-283, para. 27, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. at 809, para. 27.
t81 Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2493,
[1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 85.2 See Wielockx, 1995 E.C.R. at 2517, para. 25, [1995] C.M.L.R. at 101, para. 25.
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selves. 83 There is a balance of mutual concessions by taxing authorities in
a tax treaty. Yet, this balance is not a technical one in the sense of matching
assets being offset against each other. 8 4 A tax asset balance can only be
derived from national law as modified by a treaty, not from a treaty itself,
because the treaty is dependent on the national tax law system.185 Conces-
sions made in a treaty are not a basis for cohesion. They are mutual as far
as they are made in a do ut des mode during the negotiation. But when ap-
plied to cases, the concessions are independent from each other. A waiver
of taxing authority is made in order to tax only the income most closely re-
lated to the source, not to consider any other income or deduction at the
same time. This waiver cannot be offset against the reciprocal waiver of the
other contracting state. As the Court pointed out in Commission v. France,
the scope of Article 52 of the EC Treaty may not be restricted by any reci-
procity clause. 18 6 Treaty shopping may be disfavored for the same reasons
as the lack of cohesion in national laws, namely revenue losses. Yet, treaty
shopping does not disturb a country's tax system cohesion.
3. Administrative Difficulties
German tax authorities cannot plead administrative difficulties as a
justification for applying the limitation on benefits clause, because the
Court of Justice has found that the prohibition of discrimination is more
important than administrative burdens in the tax assessment procedure. As
the Court held in Halliburton,8 7 administrative difficulties do not justify
discriminative measures. In this case, Dutch tax authorities dealt with an
exemption from Netherlands tax on land transfer. Land transfers as a result
of corporate restructuring were exempted from such tax. One member of
the Halliburton group was incorporated in Germany under German law.
The Dutch tax authorities denied an exemption on these grounds and argued
183See Hinnekens, supra note 50, at 151. But see van Unnik & Boudesteijn, supra note
54, at 113 (arguing that similar discrimination by the U.S.-Dutch Treaty is justified on the
basis of its cohesion). See also Gallo, supra note 54, at 651, on the relationship between tax
treaties and European Union law obligations.
184 In the mentioned cases the principle of cohesion aimed at offsetting categories of levy
that were directly related to each other. Yet, different kinds of levies cannot be offset in this
sense, as pointed out in the most recent decision in this field. Case C-107/94, Asscher v.
Staatssecretaris Van Financidn, Opinion L~ger, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3089, 1-3104-06, paras. 81-88,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 61, 76-77, paras. 81-88.
185See Peter J. Wattel, The EC Court's Attempts to Reconcile the Treaty Freedoms with
International Tax Law, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 223, 238-42 (1996) (discussing the rela-
tionship between tax treaties and national law in the cohesion concept of the Court of Jus-
tice).
186Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 307, para. 26, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 401,423, para. 26. See also Case C-101/94, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1996
E.C.R. 1-2691,1-2727, para. 27, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 754, 782, para. 27.
17 Case C-1/93, Halliburton Services BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financidn, 1994 E.C.R.
1-1137, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 377.
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that they had been unable to determine whether the concerned German en-
tities were comparable to the Dutch types of entities. The Court did not
follow this argument and dismissed the case. It found no legal merit in the
Dutch government's argument concerning cost and effort concerns and
pointed out that the duty to carry out all necessary verification rested with
the government.
188
Verification problems in the context of the ownership percentage test
could occur in cases of both direct or indirect ownership. If a foreign na-
tional directly holds shares in a German company, the tax authorities do not
face a problem because the direct ownership can easily be proved. Indirect
ownership, however, can be more complicated. It consists of a multi-tier
structure and can include several entities incorporated in other Member
States, although the majority of shares may ultimately lie in the hands of a
German or U.S. individual. Accordingly, national tax authorities have to
check the ownership proportions of the involved foreign companies. There-
fore, they may argue that it would be even more difficult to conduct this in-
vestigation if the ownership test also comprised non-national entities. Yet,
the initial burden of proof is not on the authorities but on the taxpayer as
determined by national law. German tax procedure law requires the tax-
payer to give proof of all relevant circumstances in cross-border cases.
189
So, the investigation would be prepared by the taxpayer and submitted to
the authorities. If the authorities should still have doubts about ownership
percentages in foreign companies, they could rely on the EC Directive on
mutual assistance to obtain further necessary information or to verify the in-
formation given by the taxpayer. 190 As stated in the Halliburton case, the
authorities, if in doubt, need to rely on this Directive. 19 1 The authorities
even have to bear all costs for the procedure. 192 In sum, administrative dif-
ficulties presented by certain tax procedures do not justify the exclusion of
non-national entities from the scope of the ownership percentage test.
188See Halliburton Services, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-1157, para. 22, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 392,
para. 22.
189See AO, supra note 65, § 90(2).
19°See Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assis-
tance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation and
value added tax, 1977 O.J. (L 336) 15, as amended by Council Directive 79/1070/EEC of 6
December 1979, 1979 O.J. (L 331) 8.
19 1Halliburton Services, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-1157, para. 22, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 392, para.
22. See also Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R. I-
2493,1-2517, para. 26, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 85, 101, para. 26.
192See Frans Vanistendael, The Consequences of Schumacker and Wielockr: Two Steps
forward in the Tax Procession of Echternach, 33 COMMON MKT. L. Ra'v. 255, 266-68
(1996).
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4. The Rule of Reason
As these cases show, none of the specific justifications that the Court
analyzed in tax cases in making its decisions can be precisely employed to
save Article 28 of the Treaty from violating the EC Treaty. However, this
result still leaves open the way for a general justification. Using the Court's
decisions as a guideline, general justifications can also be analyzed. Even
so, no general justification derived from the Court's rules can defend Arti-
cle 28.
Many decisions of the Court employ a general rule of reason as a justi-
fication for the decisions.1 93 Decisions on tax matters fit into these public
policy considerations as they form special cases of this general rule of rea-
son, for example, cases such as the principle of cohesion 94 or the consid-
eration of comparability of residents and non-residents. 95 The rule applied
must be suitable for attaining its objective.1 96 There must be an objective
necessity and proportionality for the rule in question; in other words, the
Court verifies that the rule is not unreasonable by showing that there is no
other way of regulating the matter which would affect EC Treaty freedoms
less strongly.' 97 Therefore, a discrimination can be justified if it is based on
a legitimate objective goal, if it is suitable for attaining this goal, and if the
discrimination is proportionate to this goal.198
a. The Legitimate Goal of the Ownership Percentage Test
The discriminatory ownership percentage test will meet the general
rule of reason if, first, it is based on a legitimate goal. As with all limitation
on benefits provisions, the ownership percentage test may be considered as
a legitimate goal because it aims at the prevention of treaty shopping as dis-
favored fiscal behavior.'99 Every country that is party to a tax treaty has a
strong interest in preventing treaty shopping. The treaty parties want to dis-
courage treaty shopping for various reasons, and a limitation on benefit
clause is a mechanism for this prevention. From the view of these parties,
t93See, e.g., Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung f'ir
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494.
19 4 See Case C-204/90, Bachnann v. Belgian State, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249, 1-282-83, paras.
21-27, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 785, 808-09, paras. 21-27; Wielockx, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-2516-17,
paras. 23-25, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 100-01, para. 23-25.
195See Case C-330/91, Regina v. Inland Revenue Commissioners exparte Commerzbank
AG, 1993 E.C.R. 1-4017, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 457; Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K6ln-Altstadt
v. Roland Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 450.
196See Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wilrttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, 1-1697,
para. 32.
19 7 See id.
'
98See id.; Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio Dell'Ordine Degli Avvocati E Procurator
Di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 1-4197-98, para. 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 628, para. 37.
199See Sascha Prechal, Aspects of European Law, in Essers & Offermanns, supra note
54, at 69, 71.
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and especially from a U.S. standpoint, treaty shopping prevention is there-
fore a legitimate aim. However, whether treaty shopping is objectively
really harmful, and therefore a legitimate goal, is a disputed question.
Parties to tax treaties usually disfavor treaty shopping for several rea-
sons. The most obvious reason is simply that treaty shopping could mean a
loss of revenue to the treaty parties.2° One of the contracting states, usually
the source country, has waived or lessened its claim to tax. To the extent
that taxpayers are able to utilize these allowances, the waiving country's
revenue will be reduced.2 1 Since this country's revenue is higher if only
treaty country nationals use the treaty, there is a loss caused by treaty shop-
ping.
The informality of treaty abuse presents another disadvantage. The ul-
timate owners of conduit companies, because they are residents of third
countries, are not subject to any tax assessment or procedure in the con-
tracting states. They are not covered by the treaty-based exchange of in-
formation systems between these states.2' 2 This lack of control may lead to
further tax evasion which remains undetected and, therefore, unpre-
vented.2 °3
Next, taking advantage of favorable treaty provisions is regarded as a
privilege of the contracting states' nationals. The contracting states make
reciprocal concessions on their tax authority in order to serve their nation-
als, not the nationals of third states.2°4 Treaty shopping exploits these mu-
tual commitments because a treaty shopper profits from them although the
treaty shopper's own country is not involved in that treaty and has not made
any concession in return. Unintended beneficiaries who utilize treaties in
combination with no-tax or low-tax jurisdictions act beyond the treaties'
purpose of alleviating double taxation.20 5 Treaty shoppers can be seen as
"free-riders" on the treaty.
Also, countries that lack or have a less favorable treaty with other
countries will not be motivated to negotiate and conclude future treaties.20 6
There is no incentive to enter into a treaty and make any concessions if a
country's residents are able to benefit from other treaties by way of treaty
shopping. In turn, this limits other countries' incentives to establish an ex-
tensive treaty network from which their nationals would benefit.20 7 If a
200 See Haug, supra note 32, at 216.20 1 See id.202See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, art. 26, supra note 23 (providing that the competent
authorities shall exchange information that is relevant for carrying out the obligations of
treaty provisions as well as domestic tax laws).20 3 See van Herksen, supra note, at 20.204See Haug, supra note 32, at 218.
205 See id.
206See id. at 219.
207 See H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy, 19
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 359, 360-369 (1981).
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country enters treaty negotiations and its nationals already benefit from
other treaties, bargaining power is skewed in favor of the treaty shopping
country. That country will want to have a treaty at least as favorable as the
other treaties from which its nationals already benefit, or it will be able to
gain other concessions it would not normally receive.OS
Finally, treaty countries may be reluctant to expand their treaty net-
work because they fear multiplying already existing treaty abuses. In the
absence of any prevention, each treaty entered into potentially becomes a
treaty with the whole world.20 9 So, any country that has entered into tax
treaties and has waived parts of its sovereignty seeks to curb or eliminate
treaty shopping.
However, these arguments against treaty shopping are contested. An
argument against stringent prevention of treaty shopping is that, in general,
such prevention is protectionistic and hinders economic integration. Many
countries, including the United States and Germany, are trying to stimulate
economic growth by integrating with other countries in their region.21°
Anti-treaty shopping clauses and regional economic integration policies,
however, have contrary objectives. While anti-treaty shopping clauses ac-
tually intend, roughly speaking, to keep foreign companies out of a country,
efforts at regional economic integration such as the European Union and the
North American Free Trade Association have achieved a common, border-
less market in which companies can freely move.21 ' Existing anti-treaty
shopping clauses clearly have a negative effect on EU policies that pursue




"nFor example, the Netherlands Antilles used to be a preferred country for treaty shop-
ping. The 1948 Treaty between the United States and the Netherlands was extended to the
Netherlands Antilles by a Protocol in 1955 but the United States terminated this extension in
1987, effective as of Jan. 1, 1988. Convention Between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes,
Apr. 29, 1948, U.S.-Neth., reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6203. However, the notice
of termination has been modified, and the Treaty partly continues in force. A new treaty
with a limitation on benefits clause was signed in 1986 but is not yet in effect. Convention
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the King-
dom of the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Aug. 8,
1986, U.S.-Neth., reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6603; see also Frith Crandall, The
Termination of the United States-Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty: What Were the Costs of
Ending Treaty Shopping?, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 355, 357 (1988); Roger Lorence, Will
the World Follow the U.S. Lead on Limitation of Treaty Benefits?, 7 J. INT'L TAX'N 124, 126
(1996).2101t is this motive that led to the foundation of the European Union and the North
American Free Trade Association.2t1 See EC TRATY arts. 2, 3 (stating these goals).
21 However, the harmful effects of anti-treaty shopping clauses depend on the level of
economic integration. Once the European Union has completely harmonized its treaties with
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eign country unattractive, companies will place this investment somewhere
else. Therefore, strong anti-treaty shopping clauses can restrict the move-
ment of European companies within the EU. Together with unpredictable
application of these clauses and the remedies against them, anti-treaty
shopping clauses could discourage companies from investing within the re-
gionally integrated area. Instead of tackling the problems of these clauses,
restructuring the organization, or taking other remedies, companies may
simply invest in a different country.213 Since income for the company
means revenue for the country, this results in budgetary losses that probably
exceed the losses created by treaty abuse. A small revenue loss concerning
dividend income may be outweighed by a greater gain from other items of
income, and taxes other than income taxes. Thus, it is argued that the pre-
vention of treaty shopping has an adverse effect on investment which may
outweigh the revenue losses.214
Preventing economic integration by the use of anti-treaty shopping
laws may also have more far-reaching results than the loss of income tax
revenue. The conduit companies' investments that are banned by anti-
treaty shopping rules may have positive economic, social, and infrastruc-
tural effects on the place of investment.215
Another argument that weakens the rationale of treaty shopping pre-
vention is that the more extended a country's treaty network, the less likely
it is that treaty shopping will occur.1 6 If a country maintains a considerable
number of treaties with other countries, investors from all these countries
can take advantage of these treaties as treaty nationals, not as treaty shop-
pers from outside. A country offering its nationals many treaties makes
treaty shopping unnecessary. The incentive to engage in treaty shopping,
i.e., to find a treaty elsewhere, diminishes with the number of treaties avail-
able.21
7
Additionally, revenue losses can also occur because the administration
of anti-treaty shopping laws is costly due to their complex and partly ineffi-
cient provisions. 1 These costs can outweigh the benefits of treaty shop-
ping prevention, especially because treaty shopping does not seem to occur
the United States or concluded a single U.S.-EU Treaty, treaty shopping will no longer hin-
der further integration within the EU.
213 Treaty shopping prevention might eliminate the incentive for foreign investment. See,
e.g., Gild, supra note 166, at 581.214 See Haug, supra note 32, at 279, 280, 285.215 See id.216See id. at 281.217 See id. The United States, for example, has an extended system of tax treaties. As of
January 31, 1997, the United States had 56 income tax treaties in force. See, e.g., Fogarasi et
al., supra note 31 (listing those treaties).218See Haug, supra note 32, at 283, 284.
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very extensively in practice but anti-treaty shopping law nevertheless has
deterrent effects on investment.21 9
Finally, it can be argued that the objective to curtail treaty shopping
further deepens discrepancies between treaty law and national law. On the
level of treaty law, no perfect solution against treaty shopping has been
found. National law, on the other hand, only supplements treaty law in this
respect. Accordingly, countries implement specific anti-treaty shopping
laws into their national law system which are incomplete. This implemen-
tation, in turn, makes it more difficult to harmonize the different treaty so-
lutions. Such harmonization, however, is desirable as an effort to prevent
treaty override.220
The arguments for and against treaty shopping prevention show that a
common rationale behind treaty shopping prevention is difficult to find.
Additionally, rationales mainly determine the public policy of the United
States, a non-Member State of the EU, much more than Germany's policy.
It could be questioned whether Germany can raise its own arguments for
treaty shopping prevention when it only agreed to the stringent U.S. treaty
policy in order to have a treaty negotiated.2 21 Consequently, Germany
would lack a legitimate goal for applying the ownership percentage test. In
all, the purpose of treaty shopping prevention policies, and with it the le-
gitimacy of discriminatory prevention measures, appear to be questionable.
b. The Proportionality of the Ownership Percentage Test
Even if is assumed that treaty shopping prevention is a legitimate goal,
the ownership percentage test is not a proportionate means to attain this
goal. Rather, a more detailed treaty shopping test, which considers the ac-
tual economic links between a country and a corporation, is more suitable to
serve the goal of treaty shopping prevention.222 Economic links between a
company and its place of business are legal criteria acknowledged by the
Court. For example, the Court held in Jaderow that a Member State, in
authorizing fishing vessels to fish against national quotas, may stipulate li-
cense conditions that ensure a real economic link between the vessel and the
flag state.22
Moreover, the proof of economic links of a corporation to a particular
country (an "establishment") is not only permissible but also imperative.
As mentioned in Daily Mail, the concept of establishment always implies a
minimum genuine economic link, i.e., it requires any economic activity as
2191t is remarkable that there are apparently no cases that invoke the complex limitation
on benefits provisions in the treaties. See, e.g., Haug, supra note 32, at 284.
22°See supra note 68 (discussing treaty override).
221 See Hinnekens, supra note 50, at 152.
222 ee Essers & Offermanns, supra note 54, at 82; Hinnekens, supra note 50, at 164.
223Case C-216/87, Regina v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte
Jaderow Ltd., 1989 E.C.R. 4509, 4544, para. 26, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 556, 578, para. 26.
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opposed to the mere registration of a company as a "paper subsidiary."224
This minimum requirement was set up in that case to draw a line between
establishments and mere transfers of parts of the management of a com-
pany. Article 52 of the EC Treaty is only aplicable to economically ex-
isting establishments, not to sham companies.
Given this standard of proportionality based on economic links, the
ownership percentage test is not proportionate. As the structure of Article
28 shows, the intent to treaty shop cannot reliably be identified by just one
test.226 However, a test that is not sufficient for identification cannot fulfill
the criterion of proportionality. The application of the ownership percent-
age test may be easy, quick, and inexpensive for the tax authorities which,
in turn, potentially benefits the taxpayer. To a certain extent, it is even fair
to have a standard precisely defined by a percentage of ownership because
this standard is based on an objective criterion. Yet, these considerations
may be well-founded for the treatment of non-EU countries but cannot meet
the higher demands of non-discrimination within the EU as stated by the
EC Treaty.227 In an economic environment determined by cross-border
trade and international corporate structures, a mere percentage of ownership
cannot demonstrate any economic links. Moreover, it is arbitrary to set this
link at a fifty percent threshold which neglects several common functions of
companies. Non-German owned companies for holding, financing,28 or li-
censing purposes may have extensive management functions. Holding
companies are set up to centralize management and to separate business op-
erations due to liability reasons. This corporate structure is even promoted
in other places in tax systems.229 Although there are valid business and le-
gal considerations for the existence of holding companies, they face diffi-
culties in qualifying for Treaty benefits because they cannot prove an active
conduct of business in the concerned country of residence, as required by
one of the alternative tests in Article 28 of the U.S.-German Treaty.20 It is
also not possible to have an intra-EU joint venture of three parties from dif-
ferent Member States that participate equally in the venture and still qualify
224 Case 81/87, Regina v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue exparte
Daily Mail and General Trust plc, Opinion Darmon, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5501, para. 5, [1988]
3 C.M.L.R. 713, 717, para. 5.
22See id.2 6 See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28, 1 3249.57. The provision includes six
different tests for treaty qualification. Other treaties have even more complicated tests. See,
e.g., U.S.-Dutch Treaty, art. 26, supra note 52.
227 See, e.g., EC TREATY arts. 2, 3, 5.
28Due to free capital flows in Europe, ensured by the EC Treaty, many companies raise
their capital from multiple jurisdictions.
229Under U.S. law, for example, certain company structures may be allowed to file a
consolidated return and receive preferential treatment of dividends. I.R.C. §§ 1501, 243.
23°See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(l)(c), 3249.57. Article 28(l)(c), the
so-called active conduct of business test, excludes "the business of making or managing in-
vestments" which leaves little room for qualification by a holding company. Id.
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for the ownership percentage test.23 1 A substantial business nexus between
a company and its country of registration can be better proved by a test that
reviews in detail the activities of the company and their underlying business
purposes. Concerning the predictability of the tests in Article 28(1), it is
not sufficient to operate with wide definitions and narrow their scope in a
noncommittal Memorandum to the Treaty in the hope that the tests can eas-
ily be handled once the Treaty is in force. 2  Thus, the ownership percent-
age test is not a proportionate rule and cannot be justified under general
considerations set up by the Court.
c. The Role of the Alternative Tests in Article 28
The fact that Article 28(1) offers a variety of alternative tests still does
not eliminate the disproportionality of the ownership percentage test.
233
These tests, regarded separately, might conform to European Union law, but
Article 28(1) as a whole is discriminatory even if it only contains one dis-
criminatory test.
No strong arguments for discrimination can be made with respect to
the active conduct of business test in Article 28(l)(c).23 4 It seems propor-
tionate to set up a test that is oriented toward the activities of a company
and regards their substance as more important than the formal ownership
structure. However, the exclusion of holdings in Article 28(l)(c) seems to
be contrary to European Union law.235 Article 28(1)(d), the stock exchange
test, requires that the shares of a corporation be substantially and regularly
traded on a recognized stock exchange.23 6 This test affects the company's
choice of where its shares are quoted. However, this requirement appears to
be the same for host country companies and, therefore, not discrimina-
tory.237 The other tests in Article 28(1) which seek to identify treaty shop-
pers and qualify individuals, contracting states and not-for-profit
organizations are not discriminatory.2 8 From a foreign-owned company's
point of view, the requirements of these tests are not harder to meet than for
a company owned by Treaty nationals. Both companies must fulfill the
same requirements. The tests do not openly differentiate on the basis of
nationality. They also do not constitute hidden discrimination in the sense
231 See Marianne Burge & Dieter Endres, Treaty Shopping: the New German-US Treaty
Raises more Questions than it Answers, 18 INTERTAX 547 (1990) (analyzing Article 28 of the
U.S.-German Treaty with special regard to the impact on joint ventures).
232 See supra note 166.
233 See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1), 3249.57.
234 See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(c), 3249.57.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 238-40.
'6See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(d), 3249.57.
237But see Eric Kemmeren, Anti-Abuse Provisions in the Dutch Tax Treaties, in Essers &
Offermanns, supra note 54, at 73, arguing that a similar clause in the U.S.-Dutch Treaty in-
fringes on the freedoms of the EC Treaty.2 8See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(a), (b), and (f), 3249.57.
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that it is particularly difficult for foreign-owned companies to meet the
tests. They treat nationals and non-nationals equally.
However, these tests are designed as alternatives. A corporation may
fulfill any of the conditions in order to qualify. Instead of meeting the re-
quirements of the ownership percentage test, one may argue, companies
have the opportunity to alternatively fulfill one of the other tests. Again,
though, foreigners are not accorded treatment comparable to Treaty nation-
als. Instead of handling each test separately, the provision must be seen as
a whole. It cannot be split into single tests on the basis that a company
which is discriminated against under one test can still switch to another test.
Two arguments support this view.
First, referring a disqualified company to alternative tests is "liable to
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the basic freedoms., 239 It re-
stricts a company's choice of tests and is an additional obstacle for non-
Treaty EU nationals who cannot freely choose the test by which they qual-
ify for Treaty benefits.240 Loss of the ability to choose one of the alternative
tests because of discrimination is, itself, discrimination. To a non-national
owner of the company, having no "free choice" (as nationals have) may
make the establishment of a company less attractive and less predictable.
This adversely affects the company's potential to do business solely under
economic considerations. Accordingly, the company may change the target
country of its investment which is exactly what the EC Treaty intends to
avoid.24'
Second, while a certain ownership percentage is a "hard" factor with
clear-cut benchmarks and may be easy to verify, the taxpayer faces a
stronger burden of proof in the other tests, at least on the level of the dis-
cretionary relief procedure, and the taxpayer is more liable to be rejected.
For example, a company only dealing with passive investments cannot pass
the active conduct of business test because the test excludes "the business
of making or managing investments." 242 If this company is owned by non-
nationals, the overall barriers to the treaty benefits are higher than they are
for an equivalent German company.
5. The Public Policy Exception in Article 56
Article 56 of the EC Treaty allows Member States to limit the right of
free establishment for public policy reasons.243 However, Germany cannot
239 Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wfirttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, 1-1697, para.
32.
240 See Becker & Th6mmes, supra note 156, at 567.
241 One of the objectives of the common market of the European Union is the abolition of
obstacles to the free movement of persons. EC TREATY art. 3(c).
242U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(c), 1 3249.57.243See EC TREATY art. 56. The first paragraph of the Article reads "1. The provisions of
this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of
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rely on this public policy exception to uphold the ownership percentage test
in the U.S.-German Treaty. The Court of Justice held in Rutili that Member
States are, in principle, free to determine the requirements of public policy
according to their national needs.244 However, a concept of public policy,
as an exception to one of the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty, must
be interpreted strictly.245 The scope of that exception cannot be defined
unilaterally by a Member State but must be subject to control by the institu-
tions of the European Union.246 Therefore, public policy only allows an
unequal treatment if it serves an acknowledged purpose, and is more than
just a national limitation of the fundamental freedoms mandated under
European Union law.
The mere probability of tax evasion by treaty shopping is not an ac-
knowledged policy in this sense. In Commission v. France, the French
government tried to defend a national law which gave a tax credit to French
subsidiaries of foreign companies, but not to agencies and branches estab-
lished in France by foreign companies.247 The French government argued
that, without this discriminatory treatment, branches and agencies would be
at an advantage compared to subsidiaries. 248 Foreign companies would in-
dlude shares of French companies in the assets of their agencies to benefit
from the tax credit, which would enhance the danger of tax evasion. The
European Commission, however, showed in the proceedings of the case that
this tax strategy would increase the tax burden on foreign companies, in-
stead of reducing the French tax revenue.249 This case shows that the dan-
ger of tax evasion is generally a permissible national concern but has to be
proven in each case. It is not sufficient to rely on the danger of tax evasion
and design laws to prevent this, if there is in fact no such danger.
This rule applied to the ownership percentage test would first require
that the danger of tax evasion by treaty shopping be an underlying concern
of the ownership percentage test. From an U.S. point of view, the imple-
mentation of anti-treaty shopping clauses serves the avoidance of tax eva-
sion and can be regarded as a public policy of the United States.
250
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treat-
ment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health." Id.
244Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1231, para. 26,
[1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140, 155, para. 26. The case dealt with Article 48(3) of the EC Treaty, a
public policy exception to Article 48(1) which guarantees the free movement of workers
within the EU. EC TATr' art. 48. However, the same considerations can be applied to the
public policy exception to the freedom of establishment.
245See Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1231, para. 27,
[1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140, 155, para. 27.
246 See id.247Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 299-300, paras. 2-6, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 401,416-17, paras. 2-6.
248 See id.
249See id.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
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Germany, however, the other contracting state, perhaps did not want anti-
treaty shopping laws and only agreed to the U.S. policy to reach other con-
cessions in return. At the very least, Germany did not have strong concerns
about treaty shopping when it concluded the U.S.-German Treaty.25 1 Given
that the strict standard of Article 56 of the EC Treaty requires that public
policy exceptions be construed narrowly, this mere toleration of another
country's public policy, or even its expressed protection, might not be a suf-
ficient public policy for Germany itself. Therefore, Germany will face dif-
ficulties in establishing the concern about treaty shopping, and tax evasion
related thereto, as its national public policy. 252
Second, there must be in fact a danger of tax evasion by treaty shop-
ping. To come under the public policy exception of Article 56 of the EC
Treaty, a country has to demonstrate concretely the foundation of its anti-
treaty shopping laws. Before treaty shopping prevention can be regarded as
a public policy, a cost-benefit analysis of limitation on benefits clauses will
be required, as well as statistics demonstrating that treaty shopping really
occurs in practice. It will be difficult to give such evidence because it is
highly disputed whether treaty shopping is harmful at all.25 3 Therefore, the
Court is unlikely to uphold the ownership percentage test as justified on
grounds of public policy.
I. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT
Possible solutions to the conflict of Article 28 with European Union
law are to renegotiate the U.S.-German Treaty, or negotiate a treaty be-
tween the United States and the European Union replacing all bilateral trea-
ties. However, a company that is affected by the U.S.-German Treaty can
hardly invoke these solutions, and they would come too late to eliminate the
company's current tax disadvantages. At present, companies can only seek
legal remedies before the courts. Under German law, the taxpayer can file a
formal protest with a local tax office,2 54 bring an action before a tax court, 5
and finally appeal on points of law.256 Under European Union law, a pre-
liminary ruling of the Court of Justice can be invoked by a national court to
251 See Hinnekens, supra note 50, at 152.
252 See BEN TERRA & PETER WATTEL, EUROPEAN TAX LAW 47 (1993) (questioning
whether Germany can claim a public policy interest in avoiding treaty shopping if the pur-
pose of the limitation on benefits provision of the U.S.-German Treaty is to protect the tax
system of the United States).
253 See supra text accompanying notes 210-21
2"4See AO, supra note 65, §§ 347, 348. The protest is filed with the local tax office
which issued the assessment notice. It commences an administrative procedure which is a
mandatory prerequisite for the taxpayer's later standing in actions brought before the tax
court.
25See Finanzgerichtsordnung [Tax Court Procedure Code] [FGO] §§ 40, 41. The com-
petent court is the lower tax court in the state in which the taxpayer resides.
256See FGO §§ 115-127. The appeal is brought to the Federal Tax Court.
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clarify the question of a violation of Community law.25 7 The European
Commission, perhaps prompted by a taxpayer in a Member State, can initi-
ate proceedings before the Court against Germany on the basis of Ger-
many's violation of the EC Treaty.2- Under the U.S.-German Treaty itself,
a remedy called a "mutual agreement procedure" is available. This is a sort
of continuation of a taxpayer's request for discretionary relief under Article
28(2) and leads into an arbitration procedure.25 9 However, all these reme-
dies do not seem appropriate to solve the conflict between European Union
law and the Treaty. They are limited to individual cases and do not change
the U.S.-German Treaty or a country's treaty policy. Moreover, the reme-
dies do not have much chance of success because both parties to the U.S.-
German Treaty seem determined to apply the Treaty unchanged, and they
refer to discretionary relief as the sole remedy for individuals.260
A. Renegotiation of the U.S.-German Treaty
In view of the conflict between the U.S.-German Treaty and European
Union law, renegotiation of the Treaty seems inevitable.2 61 Germany must
amend its Treaty with the United States because Article 5 of the EC Treaty
demands that Member States take all appropriate measures to ensure ful-
fillment of the obligations of the EC Treaty, including the guarantee of the
262freedom of establishment which is impeded by the U.S.-German Treaty.
1. The Necessity of a Limitation on Benefit Clause
The easiest solution to the problem is to enter into renegotiations with
the aim of removing Article 28 from the Treaty. Given current U.S. treaty
policy, however, this solution is unlikely to be realized. Yet, there are vari-
ous reasons for a less stringent anti-treaty shopping policy which might fi-
nally persuade the United States to redefine its policy.
263
2"7See EC TREATY art. 177.
28 See EC TREATY art. 169. The discriminatorily treated company itself cannot directly
commence proceedings before the Court of Justice. An action of annulment is available but
designed to challenge the validity of EU acts, not national acts. EC TREATY art. 173. A
complaint about the Council's or Commission's failure to act will also not be successful be-
cause the harmonization of direct taxes is not covered by any express obligation of the EC
Treaty. EC TREATY art. 175.
259See U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 1, art. 25, 3249.51.
260See supra note 166.261 See, e.g., Frans Vanistendael, The Limits to the New Community Tax Order, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 293, 308 (1994).262 See EC TREATY art. 5. The Commission is empowered to enforce a Member State's
obligation under Article 5 by initiating an action before the Court of Justice against this
Member State. EC TREATY arts. 169, 171. See also Norbert Dautzenberg, EG-Vertrag und
deutsche Erbschafissteuer, 52 BETRiBs-BERATER 123, 125 (1997).263 See supra Part II.C.4.a (discussing the arguments for and against treaty shopping pre-
vention).
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2. The Implementation of the Derivative Benefits Concept
Modification of Article 28 Would reconcile treaty shopping prevention
with the freedom of establishment under the EC Treaty.264 A limitation on
benefits clause that maintains an ownership percentage test must fully take
into account ownership by EU nationals. 26 This can be best done by add-
ing EU nationality to the ownership percentage test wording 66 so that any
EU owner would count for the company's Treaty qualification.267
Alternatively, Treaty benefits could be made available to EU compa-
nies by implementation of the so-called derivative benefits concept into the
U.S.-German Treaty.268 This concept is based on a teleological view of the
treaty network as a whole. Its idea is to allow treaty benefits to the ultimate
owner residing in a third country if this third party country also has a treaty
that would make the benefits available to that person.269 No unjustified ad-
vantages to the third-country owner are created because benefits would al-
ready be available under the treaty of this third party country, and therefore
it is assumed that there are appropriate business reasons for establishing a
company outside the third party country.
This concept would harmonize a country's treaty network and simplify
tax law on an administrative level because it is less complex and more effi-
cient than time-consuming, material tests in traditional limitation on bene-
fits provisions. It does not create a disincentive for third party countries to
enter into treaty negotiations because only a narrow class of countries de-
rives their benefits from each other. Each Member State of the European
Union already has a treaty with the United States, so nationals of these
states could derive their eligibility from these treaties.
However, there are problems inherent in the idea of derivative benefits.
Existing treaties grant tax benefits to different extents, so treaty shopping
may not be fully abolished by allowing derivative benefits. The contracting
states would have to restrict the grant of derivative benefits to the extent
that the treaties in question are comparable. This raises the question of how
to define the treaties which are eligible for the application of derivative
benefits. For example, definitions used so far include the requirement of
having "in effect a comprehensive income tax convention"27 but do not
state in detail when a convention becomes comprehensive.
264See EC TREATY art. 52.265 See supra Part II.C.4.b.
266See U.S.-Germian Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28(1)(e)(aa), 1 3249.57.
267This has been done with subsequent treaties to a certain extent; however, no treaty
goes as far as recognizing a full ownership by any EU national. See supra note 53.268See Vanistendael, supra note 261, at 306-07; M.J. Ellis, Limitation of Benefits: a
Netherlands Perspective, 17 INTERTAX 344, 348-49 (1989).269 See Streng, supra note 32, at 43-51.270U.S.-Dutch Treaty, supra note 52, art. 26, 6103.28.
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Another problem with derivative benefits is that, as with limitation on
benefits clauses, derivative benefits clauses can be problematic if they be-
come too complicated, detailed, or abstract. A recent derivative benefits
clause, for example, grants derivative benefits only to companies that are
not conduit companies.2 7' This provision is tautological because the de-
rivative benefits concept is intended to offer a way out of definition prob-
lems in limitation on benefits provisions but these problems, in turn,
originate from the question of how to identify conduit companies. Deriva-
tive benefits also do not guarantee a stable multilateral solution because
treaty negotiations would merely continue on a bilateral level. However,
multilateral solutions are preferable because bilateral treaties can still break
out of the derivative benefits network or be terminated. For this reason, the
danger of treating EU nationals differently cannot completely be eliminated
by the derivative benefits concept. Host countries to EU-owned companies
could grant treaty benefits insofar as EU owners could derive benefits from
their home country treaty which would accord them treatment equal to host
country nationals. But compared to other EU nationals who cannot derive
benefits due to the lack of a treaty with the United States, they would still
be given a preferential treatment. So discrimination could still occur be-
tween different EU nationals.
To date, the United States has hesitated to adopt the derivative benefits
concept in treaties.272 Due to the growing importance of regional economic
integration, however, this attitude appears to be changing. For example, the
derivative benefits concept has been used for the recognition of nationals
from member states of the North American Free Trade Agreement.273 The
U.S.-Mexican Treaty provides that shareholders are considered for benefits
if they reside in a NAFTA country. 274 Regarding the consideration of EU
shareholders as treaty beneficiaries, the U.S.-Dutch Treaty is the first treaty
that implements a clause with derivative benefits elements, 275 and other
treaties have followed. 76  An implementation of the derivative benefits
271 See U.S.-Dutch Treaty, supra note 52, art. 26(1)(c)(iii), 6103.28.
272See Cohen, supra note 54, at 416-20; Streng, supra note 32, at 43.
273See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32
I.L.M. 289, 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
274See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex.,
art. 17(1)(d)(iii), reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5903.19 (1994) [hereinafter U.S.-
Mexican Treaty]. See also Michele Gelb, The Limitation on Benefits Provisions of the
United States-Mexico Tax Treaty, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 217 (1995).
275 See U.S.-Dutch Treaty, art. 26, supra note 52, 6103.28. See also Sugarman, supra
note 47, at 815.
276 For example, the U.S.-Luxembourg, U.S.-French, and U.S.-Spanish Treaties partially
implement EU ownership into their limitation on benefit clauses. Convention Between the
Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Government of the United States
of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
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concept in the treaties between the United States and European countries
appears to ease discrimination but does not completely eliminate it.277
B. A Pan-European Renegotiation
Renegotiation is not only necessary for the U.S.-German Treaty but
also for any other treaty between a Member State of the European Union
and the United States if its limitation on benefits clause conflicts with
European Union law. This obligation is found in Article 5 of the EC
Treaty.278  Apart from this, all European treaties with the United States
should be renegotiated with the aim of harmonizing these treaties. A pan-
European solution to treaty shopping can be reached in various ways.
One possibility is to develop uniform treaty shopping rules within the EU
by way of EU legislation.28 More promising, however, is the perspective
of establishing one single treaty between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union as a whole.81 A single treaty, which would replace all existing
bilateral treaties, could offer a solution for the problem of treaty shopping
that is open to the Member States of the European Union but restrictive
against third countries. It could create uniform and modem rules on treaty
shopping prevention as well as exchange of information procedures.
Adoption of uniform treaty shopping rules would render national treaty
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Apr. 3, 1996, U.S.-Lux., art. 24, reprinted in 2 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 5701.49; U.S.-French Treaty, art. 30, supra note 52, 3001.31; U.S.-
Spanish Treaty, art. 17, supra note 52, 8403.45. Interestingly, the U.S.-Swiss Treaty also
implements a derivative benefits test covering nationals of the EU, EFTA, and NAFTA
members, although Switzerland itself is not a Member State of the European Union. U.S.-
Swiss Treaty, art. 22(l), supra note 56, at 9101.22.
277 See Vanistendael, supra note 261, at 307-308 (arguing in favor of the derivative bene-
fits concept); Eric M. Overman, The U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty: Important Changes,
Practitioners' Response, and Primary Effects, 48 TAX LAW. 207, 228 (1994) (considering
the derivative benefits concept as a "significant liberalization from the approach adopted in
the U.S.-German treaty"); H. David Rosenbloom, Derivative Benefits: Emerging US Treaty
Policy, 22 INTERTAX 83 (1994) (explaining the reluctant and critical U.S. approach to the im-
plementation of the derivative benefits concept).
278 See EC TREATY art. 5.
279 See Tracy A. Kaye, European Tax Harmonization and the Implications for U.S. Tax
Policy, 19 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. Rrv. 109, 168-71 (1996); Marlin Risinger, U.S. Tax
Treaty Policy and the EC Directives on Parent/Subsidiary Distributions and Mergers, in
1992 Proceedings of the 85th Annual Conference on Taxation (Frederick D. Stocker ed.
1993), at 19, 22-23; see also Brian J. Arnold & Neil H. Harris, NAFTA and the Taxation of
Corporate Investment: A Viewfrom Within NAFTA, 49 TAX L. REV. 529, 109 (1994) (argu-
ing that there is a similar need for harmonization of bilateral tax treaties between NAFTA
members).280 See Risinger, supra note 279, at 23 (regarding uniform treaty shopping rules as a sub-
stantial benefit from the U.S. perspective); but see Maurice de Kleer, Towards a European
Anti-Abuse Doctrine in Direct Taxation?, 24 INTERTAX 137, 144 (1996) (arguing that two
problems with uniform treaty shopping rules would be finding a common definition of treaty
shopping and maintaining the flexibility of those rules).
281 See Risinger, supra note 279, at 23.
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shopping law useless as far as Member States of the European Union are
concerned. It could reconcile European Union law and treaty law, and re-
duce the administrative time and effort that ongoing bilateral negotiations
with many European countries require.282 With respect to some older U.S.
treaties with European countries that lack limitation on benefit clauses, 23 a
EU-wide standard of treaty shopping prevention would be more efficient
and provide benefits to the United States.
28 4
Unfortunately, the idea of a pan-European treaty with the United States
is not without its own problems. It is disputed whether the EU still needs to
be granted the competence to represent the Member States as a whole in the
area of direct taxation.28 5 Other treaty parties of the United States might
feel excluded from a single treaty. The United States would also lose its
bargaining power in view of each single European country. This aspect
would be advantageous to the European Union because the current U.S.
treaty policy hinders further harmonization within the European Union. A
European Union treaty is desirable even if does not seem practical at this
moment.286
IV. CONCLUSION
The limitation on benefits clause of the U.S.-German Treaty in its cur-
rent formulation is an unjustified violation of the freedom of establishment
mandated by the EC Treaty and is not compatible with European Union
law. Comparable clauses in other treaties between the United States and
Member States of the European Union are also incompatible with the EU
mandate. Remedies for discriminated companies are available but insuffi-
cient. Germany is under an obligation to renegotiate the U.S.-German
282 See Risinger, supra note 279, at 23; Kaye, supra note 279, at 170.
283 Existing treaties between the United States and Belgium, Greece, and Ireland have
neither limitation on benefits provisions, nor are they about to be replaced by recently signed
treaties, which contain those clauses but are still awaiting legislative approval. Convention
Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income,
July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg., reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1303; Convention Between
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 20,
1953, U.S.-Greece, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 3403; Convention Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on In-
come, Sept. 13, 1949, U.S.-Ir., reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 4403.284 See Risinger, supra note 279, at 23; Kaye, supra note 279, at 170.
285 See Kaye, supra note 279, at 170 (arguing that there is no EU competence for a U.S.-
EU treaty). But see Hinnekens, supra note 50, at 156 (finding the external tax competence
of the EU in Article 235 of the EC Treaty which grants powers to the EU to the extent neces-
sary to attain its objectives).
286 See Becker & Th6mmes, supra note 156, at 568; Haug, supra note 32, at 286-89; van
Unnik & Boudesteijn, supra note 54, at 115; Risinger, supra note 279, at 23; Risinger, su-
pra note 279, at 23; Kaye, supra note 279, at 169.
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Treaty, and should at least insist on the implementation of the derivative
benefits concept into the Treaty, provided that the United States is willing
to alter or redefine its treaty policy. However, a desirable solution to the
problem of treaty shopping can only be found in a single treaty, yet to be
negotiated, between the European Union and the United States.
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